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ABSTRACT 
As nuclear terrorism is a risk of low probability and high consequences, the 
United States is right to address it as a significant—but not the utmost—national security 
priority.  The science of nuclear forensics makes possible the characterization of nuclear 
materials used in a nuclear attack, and, as such, provides the backbone of an attribution 
program.  Nuclear forensics-based attribution serves the dual purpose of helping to 
prevent nuclear terrorism by enabling deterrence, as well as guiding and enabling post-
attack response options in the event of deterrence failure.  The deterrence that an 
attribution capability alone enables is fairly narrow in its effective scope, though this 
deterrence does cover what would otherwise be a critical gap in U.S. strategy for 
preventing nuclear terrorism.  The U.S. attribution capability is currently lacking in 
several important regards, the most significant of which is a future dearth of highly 
qualified personnel.  Since an attribution capability is a critical enabler, the United States 
must do more to efficiently develop its attribution program.  This can be done most cost-
effectively in the short term by focusing on unilateral program needs while building an 
enduring domestic political will to improve and then maintain the nation’s attribution 
capability. 
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A. RESEARCH FOCUS 
In this thesis, I examine the role of post-detonation nuclear forensics in the effort 
to identify the source of nuclear materials used in a terrorist nuclear attack on the U.S. 
Homeland.  The U.S. government desires such an attribution capability in order to deter 
the transfer of nuclear weapons or materials from states to terrorist actors, as well as to 
inform post-attack response options should deterrence fail.1  I will assess whether a 
perfect attribution capability is required for effective deterrence, or if a less-than-perfect 
capability will suffice.  In order to identify existing critical gaps, I will also consider the 
levels of reliability and accuracy with regard to forensic technology and intelligence 
support required for a sufficient attribution capability.  If the United States does not 
currently possess these levels of reliability and accuracy, are they achievable in the near 
term and at a cost it can afford to pay?  I will explore these questions against the 
backdrop of an open-source threat assessment and a review of relevant deterrence theory, 
with the ultimate goal of recommending the priority the United States should place on its 
pursuit of such an attribution capability. 
B. BACKGROUND  
1.  Importance 
The U.S. government has been concerned with the potential for clandestine 
nuclear attack since 1946, and nuclear terrorism in particular since the early 1970s.2  The 
threat took on an entirely new dimension in the 1990s with the emergence of well-funded 
and religiously-motivated transnational terrorist organizations with a demonstrated intent 
to indiscriminately inflict casualties and destruction on a massive scale.  Terrorist groups  
                                                 
1 Office of the President of the United States of America, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism 
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), 14–15. 
2 Jeffrey T. Richelson, Defusing Armageddon: Inside NEST, America's Secret Nuclear Bomb Squad 
(New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2009), 1–14. 
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have pursued nuclear weapons in the past and are likely to continue to do so in the 
future.3  In light of this threat, the denial of a nuclear capability to terrorist groups is of 
critical importance.   
States alone are realistically capable of manufacturing the fissile materials 
necessary for nuclear weapons; therefore, terrorists are left to beg, borrow, steal, or 
otherwise be entrusted by a state with fissile materials or an entire weapon itself.4  
Graham Allison, in asserting that nuclear terrorism is preventable, encapsulates the 
problem and its ideal solution thusly: “No fissile material, no nuclear explosion, no 
nuclear terrorism.  It is that simple.”5  Generally, states can become a source of nuclear 
fissile materials or nuclear weapons for terrorists in two ways—either through intentional 
transfer or through negligent disregard for the security of state nuclear assets.  The U.S. 
government has pursued policies and programs intended to address every aspect of this 
problem. 
The strategies designed to prevent terrorists from acquiring nuclear weapons or 
fissile materials generally can be thought of as either cooperative or deterrence-based.  
The Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) and the Cooperative Threat Reduction 
(CTR) Program are just two examples of cooperative programs designed, ultimately, to 
reduce the threat of nuclear materials falling into the wrong hands.6  Deterrence-based 
strategies might apply to those states not as keenly interested in securing their nuclear 
materials or weapons, or that may even be sponsors of terrorism.  The ability to hold a 
state accountable for either willful or negligent nuclear transfer, realized via post- 
 
                                                 
3 See Sara Daly, John Parachini, and William Rosenau, Aum Shinrikyo, Al Qaeda, and the Kinshasa 
Reactor: Implications of Three Case Studies for Combating Nuclear Terrorism (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 
Corporation, 2005) for an assessment of the continuing threat.   
4 Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier, “Terrorist Nuclear Weapon Construction: How Difficult?” Annals 
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 607 (September 2006): 136–137. 
5 Graham Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe (New York, NY: Times 
Books, Henry Holt and Company, LLC, 2004), 140. 
6 See U.S. Department of Energy, “National Nuclear Security Administration—Office of Global 
Threat Reduction,” http://nnsa.energy.gov/nuclear_nonproliferation/1550.htm; U.S. Department of 
Defense, “Cooperative Threat Reduction,” http://www.dtra.mil/oe/ctr/index.cfm for more information on 
these programs.   
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detonation attribution, is believed to provide a valuable deterrent.  Nuclear forensic 
science purports to make post-detonation attribution possible, thus enabling the desired 
deterrent posture.   
2.  Problems and Hypothesis 
The United States is currently relying on the science of nuclear forensics to 
provide a post-detonation attribution capability.  Based upon such a capability, the 
government has at times adopted an explicit deterrent stance.  The 2006 National Strategy 
for Combating Terrorism states, “we will ensure that our capacity to determine the source 
of any attack is well-known, and that our determination to respond overwhelmingly to 
any attack is never in doubt.”7  Consider, in light of this strategic component, then-
President George W. Bush’s carefully worded statement following North Korea’s nuclear 
test in 2006:  “The transfer of nuclear weapons or material by North Korea to states or 
non-state entities would be considered a grave threat to the United States, and we would 
hold North Korea fully accountable [for] the consequences of such action.”8  The 
credibility of the deterrent threat rests largely on the U.S. government’s “capacity” to 
attribute such a transfer to North Korea; a capacity that, in the president’s statement, was 
only ambiguously implied.  Indeed, if the capability is less than perfect, deterrence 
suffers. 
The government itself seemingly acknowledges a less than stellar capability.  The 
2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism also declares, seemingly contradicting 
the above-cited excerpt, that “We will develop the capability to assign responsibility for 
the intended or actual use of WMD via accurate attribution—the rapid fusion of technical 
forensic data with intelligence and law enforcement information.”9  Substituting the word 
“improve” for the word “develop” would have gone further toward “[ensuring] that our 
capacity to determine the source of any attack is well-known.”10  Instead the declaration 
                                                 
7 Office of the President, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 14. 
8 Matthew Phillips, “Uncertain Justice for Nuclear Terror: Deterrence of Anonymous Attacks through 
Attribution,” Orbis 51, no. 3 (2007): 441. 
9 Office of the President, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 15. 
10 Ibid., 14. 
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is, in effect, a tacit admission of any such capability’s nascence.  As of October 2009, the 
U.S. Senate is considering HR 730, the “Nuclear Forensics and Attribution Act,” the 
stated purpose of which is “To strengthen efforts in the Department of Homeland 
Security to develop nuclear forensics capabilities to permit attribution of the source of 
nuclear material, and for other purposes.”11  These clues, when taken together, indicate 
the government might, in reality, be scrambling to develop a capability upon which a 
critical part of its strategy rests and which it has perhaps prematurely implied it 
possesses. 
This potential gap between policy and the capabilities underlying that policy 
warrants further exploration.  Many implications and further questions will arise.  In 
determining what it would take to “close the gap” between reality and desire, I will 
attempt to estimate the financial, opportunity, and political-capital costs at stake.  These 
costs should be considered against a genuine assessment of the threat, as well as against 
the potential deterrent benefits derived from spending them on developing a nuclear-
forensics-based attribution capability.  The discussion should inform the degree of 
urgency with which the government should proceed. 
3.  Program Origins and Current Organization 
The science of nuclear forensics was first called upon, in an investigative 
capacity, as part of the intense U.S. effort to detect and analyze early Soviet nuclear 
activity; in fact, the United States deployed an interim detection network only months 
prior to the first Soviet atomic weapon test in 1949.12  Throughout the Cold War, the 
government sources behind nuclear detonations were generally not in doubt; therefore, 
post-detonation forensic investigations focused primarily on determining weapon type 
and design characteristics.  Since the 1990s, with the end of the Cold War and a 
perceived rise in the risk of nuclear terrorism, the aim of nuclear forensic investigations 
has shifted:  the ultimate goal has become the identification of the origins (and the 
                                                 
11 U.S. Congress, “H.R. 730—Nuclear Forensics and Attribution Act,” http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d111:HR730. 
12 Jeffrey T. Richelson, Spying on the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi Germany to 
Iran and North Korea (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2007), 88–94. 
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originators) of nuclear materials and/or weapons.  Although the science itself has not 
changed substantially over time, this need to attribute a nuclear explosion to its source 
has increased the complexity of the investigative process significantly.  In response to 
this need, the U.S. government has designed its attribution program to harness strengths 
and skill sets found across the interagency. 
Many different government agencies share responsibility for nuclear forensics-
based attribution.  In the event of a terrorist nuclear attack, the FBI would direct the 
overall investigation, coordinating the efforts of many supporting actors.13  The 
Department of Defense has recently fielded a Domestic Nuclear Event Attribution 
(DNEA) team under the auspices of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA); this 
team is prepared to gather evidence via numerous methods and transport this evidence for 
analysis.14  Several Department of Energy national laboratories participate in the analysis 
of collected pre- and post-detonation evidence.  The Department of Homeland Security’s 
National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center (NTNFC) serves as a day-to-day focal point 
for overall interagency nuclear forensics planning and coordination.  The Intelligence 
Community (IC) contributes by sharing information that could strengthen an attribution 
case; conversely, the IC receives any information resulting from forensic analysis that 
may focus intelligence-gathering efforts.  Each of these agencies, among others, plays an 
important role in program development, actual attribution operations, or both. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
I rely on a broad cross-section of literature in assessing the risk of nuclear 
terrorism, exploring the role of post-detonation nuclear forensics as it bolsters an 
attribution capability, assessing the current state of that capability, studying the deterrent 
postures so enabled, and determining the need for further investment based upon threat 
                                                 
13 For a more detailed account of the primary actors and their roles, see Joint Working Group of the 
American Physical Society and the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Nuclear 
Forensics: Role, State of the Art, and Program Needs, 2008, http://cstsp.aaas.org/files/Complete.pdf, 36–
38. 





and theory.  Much has been written, ranging from highly technical scientific textbooks to 
academic policy analysis and advocacy, and there is no broad consensus among scholars 
on these issues.  I will endeavor, therefore, to highlight the strengths and weaknesses of 
the major arguments as I analyze them, and conclude with appropriate  
policy recommendations based upon my analysis.  Since I have organized my thesis to 
include literature review throughout, I reserve a detailed analysis of the literature for 
subsequent chapters. 
The literature shows that the argument for or against more investment in a 
national nuclear forensics-based attribution capability cannot be separated from a 
thorough analysis of the risk level.  Most scholars perceive the risk as either extremely 
high or extremely low.  The risk level, in turn, is partially related to the availability of 
attribution-enabled deterrence.  Policymakers must decide what type of deterrence 
posture they desire, a decision that should be informed by the attainability of a sufficient 
attribution capability.  The literature delineates the requirements for building and 
sustaining a credible attribution capability, as well as reveals gaps in the nation’s current 
efforts.  A thorough exploration of the body of knowledge on the subject should generate 
valuable policy recommendations.  Ultimately, before assessing if the United States is, in 
fact, “on target,” I will make an informed recommendation as to what the target 
capability should be. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
I will take a policy analysis approach to the problem, utilizing a series of literature 
reviews and relying on several case studies before accepting certain findings as valid and 
making appropriate policy recommendations.  Literature reviews will be accomplished to 
determine leading schools of thought as to the threat level as well as the application of 
deterrence.  I will briefly explore scientific literature in order to explain the science 
behind post-detonation nuclear forensics and present an expected timeline for post-attack 
results.  I will also accomplish a literature review to determine the prevailing consensus 
as to program needs and current capabilities.  Existing case studies analyzing recent 
intelligence and attribution successes and failures will be briefly explored to reveal 
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potential limitations in current support capability.  In order to make a general assessment 
of the financial costs involved in achieving a more robust forensics program, I will rely 
on government documents and other sources from which appropriate unclassified budget 
information can be obtained. 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis contains five chapters.  This opening chapter introduces the thesis 
topic and research questions, identifies the importance of the research, and addresses 
certain existing problems in policy and capability.  The second chapter reviews leading 
literature on the threat itself before drawing conclusions as to the degree of alarm with 
which the nation needs to address this problem.  The third chapter reviews literature on 
the deterrence posture that an attribution capability enables, how such a posture might be 
employed, and to what effect.  Here I will also assess the degree of certainty in an 
attribution capability required for effective deterrence.  This chapter provides a general 
qualitative estimate of the benefits derived from having such an ability to deter.  The 
fourth chapter provides a layman’s technical overview of post-detonation nuclear 
forensics with a likely timeline for information provision, before reviewing leading 
literature identifying scientific and supporting requirements for an attribution capability 
and assessing current U.S. ability to meet those requirements.  This chapter concludes 
with a general qualitative cost estimate for meeting and maintaining such a capability, to 
include fiscal, opportunity, and political-capital expenditures.  Finally, the fifth and 
concluding chapter presents a summary of findings and makes overall policy 
recommendations.  The next section briefly previews the main findings. 
F. FINDINGS 
As nuclear terrorism is a risk of low probability and high consequences, the 
United States is right to address it as a significant—but not the utmost—national security 
priority.  The science of nuclear forensics makes possible the characterization of nuclear 
materials used in a nuclear attack, and, as such, provides the backbone of an attribution 
program.  Nuclear forensics-based attribution serves the dual purpose of helping to 
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prevent nuclear terrorism by enabling deterrence, as well as guiding and enabling post-
attack response options in the event of deterrence failure.  The deterrence that an 
attribution capability alone enables is fairly narrow in its effective scope, though this 
deterrence does cover what would otherwise be a critical gap in U.S. strategy for 
preventing nuclear terrorism.  The U.S. attribution capability is currently lacking in 
several important regards, the most significant of which is a future dearth of highly 
qualified personnel.  Since an attribution capability is a critical enabler, the United States 
must do more to efficiently develop its attribution program.  This can be done most cost-
effectively in the short term by focusing on unilateral program needs while building an 
enduring domestic political will to improve and then maintain the nation’s attribution 
capability. 
 9
II. ASSESSING THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM 
Is nuclear terrorism something so unlikely that it can be dismissed without much 
concern and left to novelists and screenwriters as a fear-inspiring plot line?  Or is a 
terrorist nuclear detonation likely to occur within the next ten years, as some analysts 
predict?15  Judging from the nature of certain government programs designed to reduce 
the probability of nuclear terrorism, U.S. policymakers believe it falls somewhere 
between the two extremes.  A correct risk assessment should directly inform measures 
designed and implemented to reduce this risk.  In this chapter, I assess the risk of nuclear 
terrorism and provide an overview of current U.S. efforts to mitigate this risk.  I place 
attribution-enabled deterrence of state sponsorship in its strategic context, ultimately 
assessing the importance of the program to the nation’s overall risk-mitigation effort.  I 
find that the risk of nuclear terrorism indeed falls somewhere between the two extremes.  
Additionally, although the U.S. government wisely addresses the entire risk spectrum in 
its efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism, some of the best opportunities for risk mitigation 
are found in targeting terrorist capability; attribution-enabled deterrence is uniquely 
important in this regard.   
Determining the correct allocation of scarce and valuable resources for reducing 
the risk of a terrorist nuclear attack requires a thorough assessment of that risk.  The risk 
of nuclear terrorism must be analyzed based upon the consequences of an attack and the 
probability of its occurrence.  I here use the fairly common definition of risk as a product 
of probability and consequences (R=P x C), where the probability (P) of an event is 
affected by the nature of the threat (T) and the vulnerability (V) of the system in question 
(P=T x V).  Although I will not quantitatively utilize this formula, it does provide a 
valuable framework with which to qualitatively analyze the problem. 
                                                 
15 Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe, 1–120; Bob Graham et al., 
World at Risk: The Report of the Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism 
(New York, NY: Vintage Books, 2008), xv. 
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I begin the risk assessment by reviewing literature from leading scholars 
reflecting their overall views of the risk of nuclear terrorism.16  I then briefly describe the 
potential consequences of a terrorist nuclear attack, before moving to a longer discussion 
of probability on the basis of the threat and U.S. vulnerability to attack.  I conclude the 
chapter with an analysis of current risk mitigation efforts.   
A. OVERALL ASSESSMENTS OF THE RISK 
Most academic work on nuclear terrorism acknowledges the severity of the 
potential consequences of a terrorist nuclear attack, although scholars differ as to its 
likelihood.  Graham Allison devotes the first half of his book, Nuclear Terrorism: The 
Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe, to a grim assessment of this risk.17  He maintains that, 
given the U.S. government’s current approach to the problem, such an attack is “more 
likely than not.”18  Micah Zenko reviews declassified national intelligence estimates 
covering the past fifty years before concluding that the possibility of a nuclear terrorist 
attack is very real, and that the government has been sufficiently warned.19  Matthew 
Bunn develops and applies a model which creates a quantitative result, leading to his 
conclusion that there is a “29% probability of a nuclear terrorist attack in the next 
decade.”20  Although these scholars share a similar sense of alarm about the risk, others 
perceive it very differently. 
While acknowledging the enormous potential consequences of nuclear terrorism, 
some scholars present a more moderate viewpoint on its likelihood.  John Parachini relies 
on the sparse case studies that are found in the historical record of terrorist use of WMD 
                                                 
16 Nuclear terrorism in this thesis indicates a terrorist detonation of a device producing actual nuclear 
yield.  This usage excludes the detonation of a Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD), sabotage using 
radiological materials, or attacks on existing nuclear facilities; it includes terrorist detonation of either state-
produced nuclear weapons or terrorist-built Improvised Nuclear Devices (INDs).  The discussion is thus 
limited to the most consequential form of terrorist nuclear attack. 
17 Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe, 1–120. 
18 Ibid., 15. 
19 Micah Zenko, “Intelligence Estimates of Nuclear Terrorism,” Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science 607 (September 2006): 87–102.  
20 Matthew Bunn, “A Mathematical Model of the Risk of Nuclear Terrorism,” Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science 607 (September 2006): 103. 
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to conclude that a combination of technical factors, opportunity, and leadership mindset 
all overwhelmingly lessen the risk.21  Jessica Stern offers technical, motivational, and 
organizational constraints on terrorist use of nuclear weapons while concluding that the 
probability of such an attack is extremely low.22  Robin Frost argues that “the risk of 
nuclear terrorism … is overstated,” justifying his view on technical, psychological, and 
strategic grounds.23  Frost sets out to discredit assumptions regarding the existence of a 
thriving international black market for nuclear weapons and materials, the ease of 
building a nuclear weapon once the material is in hand, and the likelihood that a “rogue” 
state might hand a nuclear weapon to a terrorist group, among others.24  Brian Jenkins 
sees nuclear terrorism as unlikely, arguing that policies in response to sensationalism are 
detrimental to U.S. national security.25  John Mueller includes nuclear terrorism in his list 
of “inflated” national security threats.26  All of these scholars, no matter where they fall 
on the “sense-of-alarm” scale, focus on several challenging prerequisites to nuclear 
capability in making their cases.  After describing the consequences of a terrorist nuclear 
attack, I explore both the intent and capability of terrorist groups before assessing the 
nation’s current vulnerability. 
B. RISK COMPONENTS 
1. Consequences 
In a worst-case scenario, the consequences of a terrorist nuclear attack would be 
horrific.  An IND might achieve yields of up to several kilotons, and, if detonated in the 
center of a city, could kill hundreds of thousands of people and cause direct physical 
                                                 
21 John Parachini, “Putting WMD Terrorism into Perspective,” The Washington Quarterly 26 (Autumn 
2003): 42–46. 
22 Jessica Stern, The Ultimate Terrorists (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 10, 48–
86. 
23 Robin Frost, “Nuclear Terrorism after 9/11,” Adelphi Papers 45, no. 378 (2005): 7. 
24 Ibid., 8–10. 
25 Brian Michael Jenkins, Will Terrorists Go Nuclear? (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2008). 
26 John Mueller, Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security 
Threats, and Why we Believe them (New York, NY: Free Press, 2006), 14–17. 
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damage ranging into hundreds of billions of dollars.27  The long-term economic and 
health consequences from elevated radiation levels would be severe.28  Similar follow-on 
attacks would almost certainly be threatened, resulting in panic and devastating the 
international economy.29  Since this scenario would be unimaginably devastating, the 
consequences (C) component of the risk equation (R=P x C) is extremely high.30  Risk, 
then, varies with probability in this case.  If the probability is determined to be greater 
than zero, risk will be proportionately high.  Available measures for reducing probability 
must be weighed against their cost, as well as policymakers’ and the public’s tolerance 
for such risk.  Before assessing measures for reducing the probability of terrorist nuclear 
attack, the intentions and capabilities of potential adversaries as well as system 
vulnerabilities must be considered. 
2. Probability—Intent 
Determining an adversary’s intent is sufficiently difficult when one’s adversary is 
a state.  The problem is further complicated when the adversary is a non-state actor.  
Although scholars disagree on the seriousness with which terrorist groups have and may 
continue to pursue nuclear weapons, as well as their intent to utilize nuclear weapons 
should they obtain them, a certain level of intent does exist and cannot be dismissed.  Al 
Qaeda has declared its intent to pursue WMD, obtained a fatwa approving the use of such 
                                                 
27 Graham Allison, “Nuclear Deterrence in the Age of Nuclear Terrorism,” Technology Review 111, 
no. 6 (November/December 2008): 71. 
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30 Not all scholars share this worst-case assumption.  I argue that regardless of first-order 
consequences, second- and third-order effects from a terrorist nuclear detonation would almost certainly be 
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preventing the most severe consequences, see Robert C. Harney, “Inaccurate Prediction of Nuclear 
Weapons Effects and Possible Adverse Influences on Nuclear Terrorism Preparedness,” Homeland Security 
Affairs 5, no. 3 (September 2009), http://www.hsaj.org/?article=5.3.3. 
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weapons, and “justified” the killing of four million Americans.31 Aum Shinrikyo’s 
founder was obsessed with obtaining nuclear weapons for the purpose of catalyzing 
“Armageddon.”32  Although Aum Shinrikyo’s founder is in prison and Al Qaeda’s 
nuclear focus may have waned, the intentions of these and other terrorist organizations 
and individuals are and will continue to be exceedingly difficult to determine with any 
precision.  The safe and conservative approach, and the one I adopt here, is to assume a 
continuing serious intent on the part of terrorist organizations to obtain and use nuclear 
weapons.33  Real or assumed serious intentions notwithstanding, all non-state actors face 
the same set of very real and difficult obstacles to achieving a nuclear capability. 
3. Probability—Capability 
States alone are realistically capable of manufacturing the Special Nuclear 
Material (SNM)34 necessary for nuclear weapons; therefore, terrorists are left to beg, 
borrow, steal, or otherwise be entrusted by a state with HEU, plutonium, or an entire 
weapon itself.35  These avenues to obtaining either SNM or nuclear weapons can be 
broken down into several categories for analysis: theft from state stockpiles, black market 
purchase, and purposeful state transfer to terrorists. 
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35 Bunn and Wier, “Terrorist Nuclear Weapon Construction: How Difficult?” 136–137. 
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Purposeful state transfer of a nuclear weapon is the most improbable scenario.  
Frost implies that the most compelling reason for a state not to share nuclear weapons 
with terrorists is simply that the state could not guarantee the weapons would not be used 
against itself.36  Further, he suggests that for lesser-power states, nuclear weapons are 
valued as a national treasure and would therefore be carefully guarded and not given 
away.37  Robert Jervis is another author who shares Frost’s conclusions, and adds—using 
the case of Saddam Hussein and Iraq—that it was not clear how sponsoring a terrorist 
attack on the United States would further any state objectives.38  Lebovic suggests that 
scholars have “[failed] to indicate what an adversary could gain from a nonconventional 
weapons attack.”39  For these same reasons, terrorist theft of a nuclear weapon, as well as 
the availability of an entire nuclear weapon on the black market, both are highly unlikely.  
States treat nuclear weapons as matters of the utmost national security, and are unlikely 
to relinquish control over them, purposefully or not. 
One notable “loophole” in states’ airtight security over nuclear weapons might 
come in the form of unstable regimes with nuclear weapons.  Much attention has recently 
been given to Pakistan and its nuclear arsenal of some 50 weapons.  With increasing 
unrest fomented by Islamic extremists, and with Taliban fighters recently advancing to 
within 60 miles of Islamabad, the Pakistani government has repeatedly reassured the 
United States that its nuclear arsenal is secure.40  Even if the worst case was realized and 
extremists took control of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, one cannot assume they would 
transfer nuclear weapons to terrorists or otherwise initiate a nuclear attack by proxy.  
Certain scholars believe that even the most extreme regimes can be deterred from using 
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or transferring nuclear weapons.41  As Lebovic simply states, “even the irrational can 
consider costs.”42  Here I point out an important caveat—this logic assumes the existence 
of a deterrent posture, which, in turn, requires the ability to determine the source of a 
terrorist nuclear attack.  However unlikely, an “irrational,” extremist-run state might 
transfer a nuclear weapon to terrorist proxies if it believed such a transfer would remain 
undetected.43  This is an important area in which the risk of nuclear terrorism is only 
reduced with the existence of an attribution-enabled deterrence capability. 
Terrorists groups, failing to obtain a functional nuclear weapon, may attempt to 
procure the necessary SNM to build one of their own.  Terrorist groups might attempt to 
steal SNM from state sources or seek to buy it on the black market.  Nothing in open-
source literature indicates that terrorists have attempted to steal SNM.  However, the 
criminal infiltration of a South African nuclear facility in 2007 exposes the feasibility of 
such thievery.44  Al Qaeda has made several serious attempts over many years to 
purchase SNM on the black market, with several notable failures and no known 
successes.45  In spite of vast resources and connections, Aum Shinrikyo was unable to 
obtain weapons or SNM and turned instead to uranium mining and enrichment in its 
nuclear quest—a quest that was ultimately a failure.46  These past terrorist attempts and 
failures to obtain SNM indicate the degree to which the supply side has failed to meet the 
demand side, which a brief look at the historical nature of the black market itself 
confirms. 
                                                 
41 See Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer as quoted in Bennett, Drake, “Give Nukes a Chance: Can 
the Spread of Nuclear Weapons make U.S. Safer?” The Boston Globe, March 20, 2005, 
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Since the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, the IAEA has confirmed only 
twenty cases of trafficking in either HEU or plutonium.47  None of these have involved 
more than a very small fraction of the material needed to produce a nuclear weapon, and 
the amount actually involving weapons-grade material is debatable.48  Open-source 
intelligence indicates a paucity of credible sellers, with scam artists and desperate thieves 
abounding.49  By itself, this lack of evidence regarding “successful” black market 
transfers to terrorists does not preclude a successful transfer of substantial fissile material 
in the future; however, there are no indications that black market conditions have become 
more dangerous.  The paucity of evidence also does not guarantee that a past transfer has 
not occurred.  Even if a transfer has occurred—or does occur in the future—the next step 
toward achieving a nuclear capability is daunting.   
Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that a terrorist organization was able to 
obtain SNM.  Would they be able to build a bomb producing nuclear yield?  There are 
several formidable obstacles.  First, approximately eight kilograms of plutonium, or 25 
kilograms of HEU, is required to build a crude nuclear weapon.50  As alluded to above, 
known black market transactions have involved substantially smaller amounts.  The 
largest was approximately 1/8th what is required.51  For a number of technical reasons, 
HEU would provide a terrorist organization a more likely path toward success than 
plutonium.52 
Once in possession of a sufficient quantity of weapons-grade HEU, a terrorist 
organization would likely select a “gun-type” design for their nuclear device.  This, the 
simplest design, involves the use of conventional explosives to force two subcritical 
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masses of HEU together at high speed, forming a supercritical mass with nuclear yield.53  
Scientists’ confidence in this simple and robust design was so high that it was not tested 
prior to its deployment over Hiroshima in 1945.54  However, a rudimentary 
understanding of the weapon design only serves as a starting point.  The HEU must be in 
the correct form, portioned and machined with a certain degree of precision.  The “gun” 
must be loaded with the correct amount of conventional explosives, and a trigger 
mechanism installed.  Such technical difficulties, among others, belie any suggestions 
regarding ease of construction.  However, seized documents indicate Al Qaeda has 
received informational support regarding nuclear-weapons design and fabrication from 
Pakistani scientists on at least one occasion.55  Moreover, given Al Qaeda’s expertise and 
experience in designing and building Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), its ability to 
assemble the right team of conventional-explosive experts cannot be dismissed.  Thus 
possessing the right amount of HEU would present a terrorist organization with a 
feasible, yet still formidable, path to a nuclear weapon.   
Though significantly less plutonium than HEU is required for a nuclear weapon, 
plutonium-based nuclear weapon construction is more difficult for a number of reasons.  
First, plutonium is more radioactive than uranium; as such, it is more easily detected and 
must be more carefully handled.  Plutonium, created through the fission process in a 
nuclear reactor, is not usable while still trapped in spent fuel—it must be separated.  Once 
separated, it is technically usable for weapons whether it is reactor-grade or weapons-
grade.56  However, making use of non-weapons grade plutonium as well as plutonium in 
oxide form would require larger quantities of the plutonium and a higher degree of 
technical sophistication.57  Moreover, plutonium cannot be used in a “gun-type” weapon, 
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but must be utilized in a more complex “implosion-type” design.58  An implosion-type 
weapon requires an almost-perfectly-simultaneous conventional explosion around an 
inner almost-perfectly-shaped plutonium core in order to begin the fission chain 
reaction.59  Determining the required amount of compression is usually done through 
sophisticated testing; this would be difficult for any terrorist organization to accomplish 
absent ample sanctuary and the associated feedback equipment.  In short, although 
creating a nuclear weapon is technically possible once the correct amount and type of 
plutonium is in hand, it would be a daunting prospect for any terrorist organization. 
As I have shown, there are several means by which a terrorist organization could 
acquire nuclear capability; some of these means are less likely than others.  States are 
highly unlikely to purposefully transfer nuclear weapons or materials to terrorists.  The 
probability of purposeful state transfer can be further reduced with a credible deterrent 
posture.  Terrorist theft of a nuclear weapon is even more unlikely than purposeful state 
transfer.  Terrorists have not demonstrated the intent to steal SNM, though such a 
scenario seems entirely plausible.  The black market for SNM has failed to produce 
quantities sufficient for a nuclear weapon, and, further, has failed to unite credible 
terrorist demand with supply.  Even if terrorists did manage to somehow obtain sufficient 
SNM for a weapon, constructing a functional nuclear device is by no means a sure thing, 
much less so for plutonium-based versus HEU-based devices.  Taken together, even 
assuming a significant intent on the part of terrorist organizations, these formidable 
obstacles to achieving nuclear capability indicate a very low threat (T) component for 
nuclear terrorism.   
4. Probability—Vulnerability 
To carry out a nuclear attack on the United States, terrorists would either have to:  
1) obtain, in the United States, a nuclear weapon or SNM; or, 2) smuggle a weapon or 
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SNM into the United States or at least as far as one of its ports.60  As long as either of 
these two avenues is available, the United States will be vulnerable to nuclear terrorism.  
Since any given state cannot absolutely control what passes over its borders, vulnerability 
cannot be reduced to zero.  However, means for reducing this vulnerability should 
become evident from a closer look at each concern. 
Could terrorists really obtain SNM or even a nuclear weapon here in the United 
States?  Such a thought would have been incredible prior to August 30, 2007.  On that 
day, a United States Air Force B-52 bomber flew from North Dakota to Louisiana with 
six nuclear-armed cruise missiles on the rails under its wings, a mistake not discovered 
until ten hours after landing.61  In essence, the United States could not account for six 
nuclear warheads for the better part of a day.  Congressman Edward Markey said it best:  
“The complete breakdown of the Air Force command and control over enough nuclear 
weapons to destroy several cities has frightening implications not only for the Air Force, 
but for the security of our entire nuclear weapons stockpile.”62  Indeed, this incident 
brings to the forefront questions about the security of not just nuclear weapons, but also 
the nation’s SNM stockpiles. 
As of 2003, the United States possessed approximately 100 metric tons of 
plutonium and 600 metric tons of HEU.63  Matthew Bunn points out several ways in 
which security of SNM at U.S. sites is deficient and could be improved.64  Among them, 
U.S. research reactors using HEU are exempt from the stringent security rules to which 
commercial reactors are subject.65  The B-52 incident and these few security deficiencies 
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notwithstanding, terrorists would likely have an easier time procuring SNM or a weapon 
outside of the United States.66  Could either be smuggled across U.S. borders? 
Given an adversary with sufficient determination and resources, the unfortunate 
answer is “yes.”  The amount of plutonium or uranium required to build a crude nuclear 
weapon could easily fit into a one-gallon container.67  Highly enriched uranium emits 
very little harmful radiation, and plutonium can be shielded for safe handling.68  Since 
the United States shares thousands of miles of remote and relatively porous borderland 
with Mexico and Canada, crossing undetected with SNM might be done over land or 
water with a minimal support network and related footprint. 
Conversely, an assembled weapon would almost certainly have to transit a land or 
sea border point due to its large size.  A major vulnerability is simply the inability to 
perform a detailed search of the millions of shipping containers entering the nation each 
year.  Additionally, the proximity of the six major U.S. maritime ports to major 
metropolitan areas leaves thousands of people within range of a nuclear detonation before 
the weapon actually crosses the border.  Thus, although difficult to quantify, in light of 
the above-described deficiencies I find U.S. vulnerability to nuclear terrorism to be 
generally high.  I address certain U.S. government programs and policies designed to 
reduce these vulnerabilities in the next section, which will place these measures in the 
context of efforts to mitigate the overall risk of nuclear terrorism. 
C. CURRENT MITIGATION EFFORTS 
Because of the relationship between threat, vulnerability, and probability (P=T x 
V), a very low threat component yields a correspondingly low probability.  Though the 
probability of nuclear terrorism is very low, it is not zero.  Recall the equation relating 
probability and consequences to risk (R=P x C).  As the probability of occurrence 
approaches zero, risk is rapidly reduced.  If the probability is zero, there is no risk.  As 
the consequences of a nuclear detonation in a city are undoubtedly severe, those who 
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would dismiss the risk of nuclear terrorism as “overblown” are assuming, either 
implicitly or not, that the probability is so small as to be virtually zero.  Since the 
probability of a terrorist nuclear attack is greater than zero, the risk of nuclear terrorism is 
present, and, due to the horrific consequences of such an attack, cannot be dismissed.  
Important steps are being taken to reduce this risk.  These steps focus on both the 
threat—the intent and capability of terrorist groups—and the nation’s vulnerability.  
The U.S. government, in partnership with other nations, is executing a 
multifaceted strategy for reducing the risk of nuclear terrorism.  The U.S. and other 
governments target the intent of Islamic terrorist groups by encouraging the spread of 
messages that lessen the appeal of nuclear weapons.  Many widely respected Imams have 
discredited nuclear weapons in general.69  These and similar messages may be effective 
at reducing the desire for nuclear weapons among terrorist groups depending on the 
support of a broad constituency; however, “doomsday” terrorist groups hoping to achieve 
“Armageddon” would likely be unfazed at such public opinion.70   
The United States also targets the intent of terrorist groups via deterrence.  Some 
aspects of this deterrence fall under what Glenn Snyder called “deterrence by denial.”71  
Such deterrence is achieved by creating barriers that make a successful attack less likely, 
as well as by reducing the potential gains of a successful attack.72  Barriers to a 
successful attack include radiation detectors and other forms of cargo screening at U.S. 
ports of entry, as well as interdiction efforts targeting nuclear-materials trafficking 
worldwide.73  The government is taking steps to bolster response and recovery plans, 
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training, and capability to help mitigate the consequences of a successful nuclear attack.74  
These “deterrence by denial” efforts may also be categorized as vulnerability mitigation 
efforts, and some will be described in greater detail below.   
Other deterrence-based intent-mitigating efforts, such as threats of an 
“overwhelming response” to terrorists following WMD attacks, directly reflect 
“deterrence by punishment” strategy.75  The United States’ ability to dissuade certain 
terrorist groups from pursuing or using nuclear weapons via promises of retaliatory 
actions is less than assured.  Although such efforts may yield positive results and should 
be continued, I argue that the most effective, universal measures for reducing the threat of 
nuclear terrorism focus not on terrorist intent, but capability. 
There are multiple ways of targeting the nuclear capability of terrorist groups.  
The United States has maintained the offensive against Al Qaeda, thus largely denying 
them the sanctuary required to develop and build a nuclear weapon.  The international 
community has joined in disrupting terrorist finances, limiting funding for black-market 
purchases and operations in general.  Many additional programs and policies more 
specific to the nuclear threat are in place as well. 
The policies and programs utilized to prevent terrorists from acquiring nuclear 
weapons or SNM generally can be categorized as one of two types—cooperative or 
deterrence-based.76  Several cooperative organizations and regimes have been created or 
strengthened in an effort to prevent the unintentional transfer of SNM to terrorists.  The 
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR) has been active since the early 1990s to 
secure and dismantle nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union.77  The Proliferation 
Security Initiative (PSI) was launched in 2003 as a voluntary effort among participating 
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nations (now more than 90) to stop the trafficking in WMD and related materials.78  The 
PSI uses enhanced information-sharing and cooperation across law enforcement and 
intelligence boundaries to prevent transactions by arrest and/or interdiction.  More 
recently, in 2006 the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) was created, in part, to 
remove, properly dispose of, or ensure the protection of SNM worldwide.79  Although 
problems remain, these programs work together to decrease the overall likelihood of 
transfer.   
Deterrent strategies have been designed to cover those areas beyond the “reach” 
of cooperative programs.  Potential targets, which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 
III, might include any semi- and non-cooperative nuclear states, regardless of whether 
they are known sponsors of terrorism.  The United States has proclaimed its 
“determination to respond overwhelmingly to any [WMD] attack,” and targeted this 
threat in general at “terrorists and those who aid or sponsor a WMD attack.”80  An 
attribution capability alone provides the basis for such deterrent threats, thus filling what 
might otherwise be a critical gap in strategy.  Importantly, the United States has also 
anticipated terrorist acquisition of a nuclear capability, whether through deterrence failure 
or not, and taken steps intended to reduce the nation’s vulnerability. 
Vulnerability can be reduced, in part, by preventing SNM or nuclear weapons 
from reaching and passing through U.S. ports or from otherwise crossing national 
borders.  The Department of Homeland Security’s U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
(CBP) agency has two major programs in place designed to prevent terrorist weapons or 
materials from entering the country:  the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism 
(C-TPAT), and the Container Security Initiative (CSI). 
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C-TPAT, a public-private sector partnership started in November 2001, has now 
established links with more than 7,400 companies.81  This program provides benefits and 
incentives to member companies, which include expedited shipment processing, in return 
for improved security along member companies’ entire supply chains.82  C-TPAT thus 
establishes a shared responsibility for security from which mutual benefits are derived.  
However, since participation is voluntary, the security enhancements are not 
comprehensive.  C-TPAT, then, is but one layer of CBP’s defense that complements 
another—the Container Security Initiative.83 
CSI is a multinational program designed to identify and pre-screen high-risk 
shipping containers before they leave foreign ports.84  Bilateral agreements allow multi-
discipline CBP teams to operate in foreign ports currently covering approximately 85% 
of the containerized maritime cargo bound for the United States.85  Required trade data is 
used to determine high-risk containers, which are then singled out for either non-intrusive 
or physical inspection.86  Non-intrusive inspection is often accomplished with radiation-
detection equipment provided through the National Nuclear Security Administration’s 
“Megaports Initiative.”87   
The four major types of radiation-detection equipment currently in use by the 
United States each have certain technological limitations that decrease their efficiency; 
these range from false alarms to simple failure to detect contraband when sufficient 
background noise is present.88  These technological limitations do not seriously impede 
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CBP operations; however, they do leave open certain vulnerability gaps in the nation’s 
borders.  The now-unfunded Advanced Spectroscopic Portal and Cargo Advanced 
Automated Radiography System together promised to fill existing vulnerability gaps in 
the near term, as well as provide a technological bridge to fill still more in the future.89  
The research and development for these programs surpassed designated timelines and 
budgets, and the technology ultimately failed to meet expectations.90  In addition to 
lingering deficiencies at border checkpoints, Senator Joseph Lieberman suggests that 
avenues for nuclear smuggling such as “general aviation, small-craft maritime activities 
and unprotected land border areas” are left vulnerable due to the unrealized promise of 
new technology.91 
This discussion of current risk-mitigation programs illustrates the overall effort 
the United States is making to reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism, both in terms of 
terrorist intent and capabilities as well as with regard to national vulnerability to nuclear 
terrorism.  Taken together, these efforts compose a strategic puzzle in which the 
attribution-enabled deterrence of state sponsorship of nuclear terrorism represents only 
one piece.  However, efforts at reducing national vulnerability or targeting terrorist intent 
appear to offer less promise for lowering risk than does working to prevent terrorists from 
acquiring a nuclear capability.  Attribution-enabled deterrence fills a critical role in this 
capability-denying prevention effort. 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Overall, the threat component of nuclear terrorism is very low, yet the overall risk 
remains significant due to the enormous potential consequences of an attack, as well as 
the relatively high level of U.S. vulnerability to attack.  In this chapter, I have provided a 
detailed risk assessment, demonstrating the importance of individual policies and 
programs by pointing out what risk-mitigating needs they meet.  Risk may be mitigated 
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by lowering the probability or consequences of attack, as well as the nation’s 
vulnerability to attack.  I find that reducing the probability of attack by targeting terrorist 
capability currently offers the best potential results.  Several obstacles inherent to the 
process of obtaining a nuclear capability can be exploited to further lessen the probability 
that any terrorist group will achieve nuclear “success.”  For example, though likely 
reticent in any event to transfer nuclear weapons to terrorists, states can be deterred 
through a posture enabled by an attribution capability, reducing an already low 
probability.  Additionally, better security for SNM stockpiles around the world will 
reduce the possibility of theft or black-market availability to terrorists.  The United States 
rightly invests in programs intended to exploit these obstacles.  
 27
III. DETERRENCE THEORY 
Regardless of the current status of its nuclear forensics-based attribution 
capability, the United States must determine the appropriate application of the deterrence 
strategies it might enable.92  In this chapter, I will provide a policy-oriented analysis of 
this aspect of deterrence, first placing it in strategic context and then analyzing it on a 
theoretical basis.  Along the way, I will address questions of whether and to what degree 
it is possible to deter “rogue” state sponsors of terrorism, and whether a perfect 
attribution capability is required for effective deterrence or a less-than-perfect capability 
will suffice.  I will explore certain attribution-enabled pre-attack deterrent postures as 
well as potential post-attack responses.  Balancing issues of credibility and effectiveness, 
I will recommend the deterrent posture the United States should adopt.   
As a starting point, I borrow the following useful definition:  “deterrence can be 
defined as the use of threats by one party to convince another party to refrain from 
initiating some course of action.”93  In analyzing the potential utility of any given 
strategic initiative that relies on deterrence, each element of this concept must be 
considered:  Who wishes to deter whom from initiating precisely what action, and how 
convincing are these threats?   
A. WHO? 
At first glance, this seems to be the easiest question to answer—the United States 
is the actor issuing the deterrent threats in this case.  It is important, however, to make 
some further distinctions in this area.  Although the 2006 National Strategy for 
Combating Terrorism is still in effect, a new presidential administration has come to 
power.  It was President Bush who issued the deterrent threat to North Korea in a 2006 
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speech—does that threat continue unabated under President Obama?  More importantly, 
does North Korea interpret it thusly?  I submit that the deterrence of state sponsorship of 
nuclear terrorism falls somewhere in between “immediate” and “general” deterrence.94  
The situation cannot be described as a crisis, per se, though neither does it reflect the 
“relaxed,” regulated relationship of general deterrence.95  As such, subsequent 
administrations must carefully consider how often, and how necessary it is, to reiterate 
the previously stated posture.  In such an environment, the commitment of a new 
administration cannot be left as an assumption in the mind of an adversary. 
Although questions of the character, or reputation, of the actor making deterrent 
threats also can affect credibility, I will address these in the “How Convincing?” section 
of this chapter.  I now turn to the important question of exactly what action the United 
States should attempt to prevent. 
B. PRECISELY WHAT ACTION?  
A logical and useful foundation when formulating or analyzing any deterrence 
strategy is to determine precisely which undesired action or actions one wishes to 
prevent.96  In our case, that action is state transfer of nuclear weapons or materials to 
terrorists.  As it now stands, the U.S. threat implies the purposeful transfer of weapons 
and materials.97  Several authors call for an expansion of this deterrence to include 
unintentional transfers to terrorists.98  This is obviously a major distinction and carries 
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with it important implications.  As Jeffrey Knopf points out, “it is inherently more 
plausible to deter some actions than others.”99  I now analyze some of these proposals in 
order to determine the most appropriate target action for U.S. deterrence strategy in light 
of overall objectives and potential inherent tradeoffs. 
Anders Corr recommends a policy of deterring both the intentional and accidental 
transfer of weapons or fissile material to terrorists.100  He defines his “negligence 
doctrine” as the employment of policies designed to hold a state culpably negligent for 
“noncompliance with IAEA standards in the storage of fissile material [resulting] in that 
fissile material being lost or stolen and used for nuclear terror.”101  He includes in such 
policies the issuance of explicit deterrent threats, to include a proportional nuclear 
response, arguing that only these policies will provide the necessary incentive for certain 
states to sufficiently protect their fissile materials and nuclear weapons.102  He claims 
that cooperative programs not only have yielded less-than-stellar results to date, but they 
also create perverse incentives to “export” security at a steep price.103  The solution, in 
his view, is to create incentives to better cooperation via deterrent threats. 
Philipp Bleek finds that such policies, which he deems “deterrence of 
negligence,” would not significantly decrease the risk of nuclear terrorism and in many 
aspects may even intensify it.104  He focuses specifically on the cases of Russia and 
Pakistan in arguing that an explicit deterrence-of-negligence policy would negatively 
affect existing cooperative programs by provoking these countries to be less transparent 
than they already are.105  He acknowledges that, especially in the Russian case, perverse 
economic incentives may be hindering less than stellar cooperation and effort; however, 
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he also points out that, negative incentives notwithstanding, Russia on its own is likely 
not capable of achieving the desired level of security.106  Thus increased cooperation is 
necessary—the type of cooperation not typically achieved by resorting to overt threats.107  
Since a large degree of transparency and cooperation is likely necessary for a legitimate 
attribution result, and states fearing a painful retaliatory response for their unintentional 
negligence would be less inclined to cooperate both before and after a nuclear terrorist 
attack, Bleek suggests that such a policy would hinder efforts at preventing both initial 
and subsequent attacks.108  In making these arguments, Bleek assumes deterrence-of-
negligence threats are plausible, acknowledging that, if not, the debate is moot.109 
While not pausing for a thorough treatment of the plausibility of deterrence of 
negligence, I here infer the increased difficulty involved by pointing out that such a 
strategy more closely resembles compellence.110  Logically, a state cannot decide to 
unintentionally transfer weapons or materials to terrorists.  Therefore, rather than 
deterring an unintentional action, deterrence of negligence actually intends to compel 
deliberate actions which, in turn, prevent the ultimately undesired action from transpiring 
accidentally.  In such a compellence stance, the proverbial “Sword of Damocles” is hung 
above another state’s head, not to be dropped if the state initiates an action but if its 
failure to initiate certain actions—e.g., taking full and appropriate steps to secure fissile 
material stockpiles—results in an act of nuclear terrorism.  It is inherently more difficult 
to achieve policy goals through compellence versus deterrence.111 
The above analysis indicates that the United States should primarily aim to deter 
the purposeful, vis-à-vis unintentional, transfer of nuclear weapons or materials to 
terrorist groups.  This more plausible approach avoids provoking less cooperative 
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attitudes and actions from key international partners.  This recommendation is not 
intended to preclude consideration, on a case-by-case basis, of announcing a deterrence-
of-negligence position; however, much care must be taken to clearly communicate 
expectations, timelines, and methods for verification, with the ultimate goal of 
establishing a cooperative vice coercive regime. 
Jeffrey Knopf describes a framework within which to consider the application of 
deterrence, with the broadest extreme labeled “systemic deterrence,” and the narrowest—
“tailored deterrence.” 112  He advocates finding a middle ground between the two, the 
employment of which would include delineating a line that cannot be crossed, as well as 
describing situation- and actor-specific responses.113  In this case, the inviolable line 
should be the purposeful transfer of nuclear weapons or materials.  This line might 
occasionally be shifted to include unintentional transfer in specific situations and for 
certain actors, but the shift must be communicated such that intentions and consequences 
are clearly understood by all actors.  In the next section, I explore the sometimes complex 
relationship between the undesired actions and the actors to be deterred.  
C. WHOM? 
The behavior that the United States wishes to deter, at its simplest, is state transfer 
of nuclear weapons or materials to terrorists.  Hence, the referent object of deterrence 
would appear to be the state.  However, once the concept of the state is un-
anthropomorphized, the problem becomes quite a bit more complex.  The abstract 
concept of the “state” cannot transfer anything to anyone, per se.  For purposeful transfer 
to terrorists to take place, any person or group of people who exercise control, however 
absolute or limited, over state nuclear assets would have to decide to effect such a 
transfer and then subsequently execute the decision.  This list of people might include 
dictators, elected leaders, ruling councils, military leaders, and state nuclear scientists, 
among others.  Must all of these actors be analyzed as potential targets for deterrence? 
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Proponents of the unitary-rational-actor approach might argue that the strategic 
significance of nuclear weapons and related technology dictates that a state maintain tight 
control over these assets.  The head of state along with, possibly, a close circle of 
powerful elites, would exercise infallible decision-making authority.  The state could thus 
be considered to act in a unitary, rational manner.  In the case of Pakistani scientist A.Q. 
Khan and his proliferation network, however, significant divergence between the official 
government position and the actual administration of nuclear technology and secrets was 
evident.114  Though the buyers in Khan’s network were not terrorists, it is not overly 
difficult to imagine terrorist buyers at the end of such a supply chain in the future.  A 
deterrent posture based on a unitary-rational-actor model, possibly threatening massive 
retaliation for state transfer of nuclear assets, would likely not be effective in preventing 
such activity. 
Alexander George is a proponent of an actor-specific approach.115  He suggests 
replacing the often-faulty assumptions made by the unitary-rational-actor model with all 
available information about an adversary’s mindset, methods of calculating costs and 
risks, and the internal decision-making apparatus.116  This approach also takes into 
account asymmetric motivations and internally divergent interests.117  George takes care 
to distinguish between these conceptual models and the strategies based on them: 
“Concepts do not tell us what must be done in various situations with regard to specific 
adversaries in order to achieve deterrence.”118  Strategies, however, are derived from 
these theoretical concepts and built to fit the context-dependent situation.119   
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Although building detailed actor-specific conceptual decision-making models for 
each potential nuclear-terrorism sponsor is outside the scope of this thesis, it is still 
possible to make initial and general deterrence strategy recommendations based upon the 
apparent potential intent of each state.  I now transition to a more practical analysis of 
potential deterrent targets, leaving to policymakers and analysts the detailed modeling 
and strategy construction best realized at classified information levels.   
There are presently very few states in the world that would plausibly execute a 
purposeful transfer of nuclear weapons or materials to terrorists.  North Korea, an 
international pariah likely possessing nuclear weapons and unknown quantities of HEU 
and plutonium, immediately comes to mind.  Iran, currently enriching uranium though 
not yet believed to have a nuclear weapon, has a history of terrorist sponsorship as well 
as belligerence toward the West.  Other states, such as Pakistan and Russia, are not 
presently threats with regard to purposeful transfer.  Currently, the only two state targets 
for deterrence of purposeful transfer are North Korea and Iran. 
On the other hand, a deterrence-of-negligence strategy could be applied to any 
state possessing nuclear fissile materials deemed not to meet protection and safeguard 
standards.  As of 2005, 74 states together possessed over 3,700 tons of either HEU or 
plutonium.120  Many of these states are developed countries and close allies of the United 
States.121  In contrast to former Soviet states, the United States does not provide financial 
assistance for nuclear security to developed states.122  However, diplomatic pressure has 
been successful at improving certain of these states’ security measures in the past, and the 
relationships can generally be thought of as cooperative.123  Applying a deterrence-of-
negligence strategy to these states would be awkward at best, and counterproductive in 
the worst case. 
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If deterrence-of-negligence threats would actually hinder the cooperation so 
essential to forensics-based attribution, then in cases where the potential for cooperation 
or some level of cooperation already exists, deterrence-of-negligence should not be 
chosen as a strategy.  What, then, can be done to mitigate the possibility that a rebellious 
general or scientist may purposefully transfer materials to terrorists? 
Although purposeful transfers by individuals are already addressed, in part, by 
cooperation regimes, stronger targeted deterrence strategies would help further reduce the 
risk.  For example, various initiatives resulting from the 1991 Nunn-Lugar Act have 
helped to reemploy thousands of former Soviet weapons scientists in peaceful high-tech 
endeavors.124  To further reduce the risk, individual actors might also be deterred by 
more severe threats of punishment.125  Such a policy would fall under Knopf’s 
framework as outlined above with the inviolable line set at purposeful transfer, and actor-
specific responses outlined as necessary.  For cases of sub-state individual or group actors 
some creative diplomacy might be required; for example, the purposeful transfer of 
nuclear materials or weapons to terrorists could be deemed a “crime against humanity,” 
with justice to be meted out by the International Criminal Court.  Short of that, the United 
States could work with individual countries to ensure citizens found guilty of violating 
this norm would be subject to the harshest of penalties.  These cooperative and deterrence 
strategies would complement each other in states that are willing to cooperate.  States that 
will not cooperate with the international community to reduce the risk of purposeful 
individual or overall unintentional transfer constitute a different case entirely.   
Conveniently, the states that are the least likely to participate in cooperative 
regimes are also those most likely to purposefully transfer nuclear materials to terrorists.  
I now turn my attention back to North Korea and Iran.  The need for deterrence to 
preclude purposeful transfer has been demonstrated; additionally, in these situations it is 
also essential to move the inviolable line to also cover unintentional transfer.  This 
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precludes these uncooperative regimes from claiming, after an attack and in order to 
avoid retribution, that the material was stolen or leaked by a lower-level operative.126  
Pre-attack deterrent threats also serve as a warning to these states that to possess nuclear 
weapons and materials brings with it a heavy and potentially consequential responsibility.      
Summarizing my position on the referent objects of deterrence, I suggest that the 
U.S. government should treat non-cooperative, adversarial states as unitary, though not 
necessarily rational, actors.  Conversely, the United States must look inside cooperative, 
friendly states to find specific objects for deterrence.  Actor-specific analyses can and 
should be utilized in both cases.  For both types of states the expectation must be that the 
tightest of control is exerted over nuclear weapons and materials; however, this problem 
cannot be assumed away.  It is best addressed with a mixture of cooperative and 
individual-actor-specific deterrence strategies in friendly states, and with a unitary-actor 
deterrence strategy when dealing with adversarial states. 
Now that I have addressed both what the United States should reasonably attempt 
to deter and the list of adversaries that should be targets of this deterrence, I turn to the 
last element of the deterrence construct.   
D. HOW CONVINCING? 
In this section, I analyze deterrence strategy in light of theoretical propositions for 
deterrence success and failure.  Richard Ned Lebow identifies four primary conditions for 
successful deterrence:  a clearly defined commitment, the effective communication of the 
commitment to adversaries, the capability to act in defense of the commitment, and a 
demonstration of the resolve, or intent, to carry out the threatened actions.127  These 
factors together constitute the basis for the credibility of a given deterrent stance.  Lebow 
is careful to point out, however, that credibility ultimately is a subjective concept that 
resides in the mind of the adversary.128  As such, it is extremely difficult to measure and 
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assess.129  Lebow suggests that his primary conditions may be used to gauge the 
credibility of a given deterrence strategy.  This is the technique I here apply to current 
and potential U.S. deterrence strategy regarding state support for nuclear terrorism.  
1. Commitment—Clearly Defined and Communicated  
The commitment of the United States to protect its citizens and homeland, 
especially from the horror of nuclear terrorism, is obviously strong and should be 
implicitly understood.  This basic commitment should never be a question in the mind of 
any possible state sponsor of terrorism.  The commitment to prevent the transfer of 
nuclear weapons or materials to terrorists, directly enabling an attack on the United 
States, could be seen as nearly equally strong, but this cannot be left implicit.  Since the 
act of transferring weapons or materials to terrorists enables an attack, but in itself is not 
the attack, the United States must clearly communicate its intent to treat those who enable 
an attack equally as culpable as those who execute the attack. 
The United States has indeed made this clear in the most general sense.130  What 
remains is for the nation to determine in what cases it will treat the unintentional transfer 
as the equivalent of intentional, how explicitly it should communicate such nuances to 
adversaries, and how explicitly and specifically it should communicate deterrent threats. 
2. Capability 
According to Lebow, the defensibility of a commitment can be thought of in 
terms of either actual military defense or the ability to retaliate against the adversary.131  
The United States possesses more than adequate military capability to respond to 
adversaries that sponsor nuclear terrorism.  The crux of the capability problem, however, 
lies not in military capability to respond, but in the U.S. government’s capability to 
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reliably attribute state sponsorship of a nuclear attack.  This begs the question:  how does 
an imperfect attribution capability affect the credibility of U.S. deterrent threats?  
Additionally, should the United States modify its threats based upon the current inexact 
nature of the art and science of attribution? 
Michael Levi tackles these problems in some depth.  Correctly maintaining that 
nuclear forensics-based attribution will never achieve perfection, he nonetheless uses the 
assumption of perfection in establishing a preferred-policy baseline before assessing the 
impact of an imperfect capability.132  To get around the problem of an imperfect 
attribution capability, Levi recommends “split[ting] the burden of proof,” such that 
retaliation would be based upon strong but not infallible evidence.133  This would 
ostensibly force a state accused on the basis of such strong evidence to demonstrate that it 
was not, in fact, involved.  The state would need to make all aspects of its nuclear 
programs and materials transparent and available, which would be very difficult 
practically to accomplish with a sufficient degree of trust.  This difficulty, coupled with 
the knowledge that retaliation could come as a result of strong evidence, should serve to 
make the deterrent threat more credible in the mind of an adversary.   
Therefore, with the adoption of a deterrence strategy based upon a split burden of 
proof, the capability aspect of deterrence credibility should not suffer as long as the 
attribution capability of the United States is sufficient to gather compelling evidence.  
Levi asserts that U.S. ability to create a robust attribution case would be strong regarding 
North Korea and relatively weak for Russia, Pakistan, and Iran; he bases this assertion on 
the accessibility of nuclear material databases for each state in question.134  This provides 
additional support for treating North Korea as a special case.  However, even in a 
situation where U.S. capability is plausible, it is important to ask how an attribution case 
resting on imperfect evidence would affect U.S. intent to respond.  I address this and 
other issues of intent in the following paragraphs. 
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3. Intent 
The United States’ intent to respond may be questioned based on the strength of 
evidence supporting an attribution claim, on the nature of the deterrent threat itself, and 
on reputational factors.  I first focus on how an imperfect attribution capability might 
affect the U.S. intent to respond, linking that intention to the explicit pre-attack threat, 
before transitioning to a discussion of reputational factors.  
Clearly, the United States would intend to respond based upon absolute proof of 
state complicity in a nuclear attack.  Would an adversary perceive the same intent if U.S. 
retaliatory policy was based upon strong evidence alone?  I submit that it would depend 
on the nature of the threatened response.  There are moral problems inherent in any 
military retaliation visited upon a state that may be innocent, however small that 
possibility may be.135  These moral problems increase, and credibility proportionately 
decreases, with each degree of violence explicit in the threatened response.  Although, to 
the degree that innocents would suffer for the actions of a few, it might be argued that 
this graduated moral dilemma would exist even with perfect attribution confidence, I 
contend that the effect is magnified when retaliatory threats are based on imperfect 
evidence.  The choice of threatened response is critical, then, as it cannot be so extreme 
as to strain credibility yet must threaten pain sufficient to deter.   
Regardless of attribution confidence, an explicit threat to retaliate with nuclear 
weapons would likely not be perceived as credible.  Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald 
find that the non-use of nuclear weapons after 1945 can be accounted for not by rational 
deterrence alone, but with a normative element as well.136  Lawrence Freedman points 
out that, whether nuclear use is inhibited by normative pressure or simply by fear of 
retaliation in kind, there is a large political cost inherent in the use of nuclear weapons.137  
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Indeed, both rational deterrence and norms help to explain the implausibility of a nuclear 
response.138  From a rational perspective, a target state armed with even a small number 
of nuclear weapons would have deterrent leverage in the form of a potential counter-
retaliation strike.  A U.S. nuclear retaliatory first-strike intended to destroy the target 
state’s capacity for counter-retaliation, in the process killing many thousands of citizens, 
would be beyond all moral justification and egregiously violate the established norm of 
nuclear non-use. 
The threat of regime-change via conventional military attack is much more 
plausible from a normative perspective, though attacking a nuclear-armed state, even 
with conventional weapons, is similarly problematic to the situation described 
immediately above.  Such a strategy would have to be carefully executed to avoid placing 
the targeted state’s leadership in a situation where they feel they have nothing to lose.  
Would a less severe threat then be in order? 
Any explicit pre-attack threat less severe than regime change would be 
unpalatable for a number of reasons.  First, the possibility that a regime, which sponsored 
a terrorist nuclear attack against the United States, could remain in power would not be 
well-received by the American people.  Second, it would be difficult to find a target set 
that could approach the equivalent pain level of a nuclear attack in a U.S. city.  Third, 
threatening anything short of regime change might not increase the calculated cost 
sufficiently to affect deterrence in the mind of the adversary. 
This dilemma is best solved by distinguishing between pre-attack threats and 
actual post-attack response.  A purposefully ambiguous pre-attack threat to respond 
severely would credibly convey to an adversary that there would be a high cost to pay; it 
would also leave all post-attack response options open.139  I make recommendations 
regarding each component of strategy later in this chapter.  I now turn to reputational 
factors of credibility.   
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Although the effect of reputational factors on credibility is debatable, I argue that 
the United States is well positioned regardless.  Lawrence Freedman reviews arguments 
for and against the importance of reputation before concluding that, “assumptions will 
have to be made about character, and these must come from somewhere … there is no 
reason to suppose that past impressions are irrelevant.”140  Daryl Press sets out to 
demonstrate that a state’s credibility is not determined by its past behavior, but rather the 
present calculation of capabilities and interests involved.141  If, indeed, reputation based 
on past behavior is an important variable influencing credibility, the United States has 
made a strong case for resolute response with its actions in both Afghanistan and Iraq.  If 
the opposite is true and the present balance of capabilities and interests trumps reputation 
as an influential variable, again the United States has a strong case in that a nuclear attack 
on its homeland is undoubtedly an attack on a vital interest.   
Interestingly, Press demonstrates that concerns for future credibility often spur 
leaders to pursue aggressive foreign-policy options.142  Such concerns, indeed, may enter 
into decision makers’ thinking after a terrorist nuclear attack, leading them to elect an 
extreme response.  This may be mitigated, in part, by the length of time required for 
attribution analysis and the adversarial process inherent in the democratic system.  
Regardless of the effect of this phenomenon, it should not prove detrimental to the 
credibility of U.S. pre-attack deterrent posture.   
I have now completed an analysis of the deterrence concept with regard to 
deterrence of state sponsorship of nuclear terrorism, analyzing who is deterring whom 
from initiating precisely what action, and how this convincing takes place, applying 
various deterrence theories to practice.  Before making recommendations based upon this 
application of theory to strategy, I briefly address an additional reason for deterrence 
failure.   
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E. DETERRENCE FAILURE 
Deterrence can fail for any number of reasons, some of which were either directly 
addressed or at least alluded to above.  These include, among others, an incredible 
deterrent threat, an insufficient communication or signaling of intent, and a 
miscalculation of gains and losses.  I here wish to address an additional reason for 
deterrence failure that was not obvious from the above discussion. 
Jeffrey Berejikian presents a theory of deterrence based not on traditional rational 
choice, but on certain cognitive assumptions that fall under the label of “prospect 
theory.”143  He finds that “decisionmakers do not maximize in their choices, are apt to 
overweight losses with respect to comparable gains and tend to be risk averse when 
confronted with choices between gains while risk acceptant when confronted with 
losses.”144  These choices are made relative to a reference point, which is often the status 
quo.  A state that perceives the status quo as satisfactory or beneficial is operating in a 
“gains frame;” conversely, a state dissatisfied with the status quo is operating under a 
“losses frame.”145  Deterrence can fail when a state is already in or is forced into a losses 
frame.146  In fact, Berejikian warns that the deterrent threat itself may push a state into a 
losses frame.147  His hypothesis holds interesting implications for both North Korea and 
Iran. 
North Korea has been expressing dissatisfaction with the status quo for some 
time, while Iran’s situation is more difficult to discern.  Given the inherently low 
attractiveness of sponsoring nuclear terrorism,148 a state reasonably satisfied with the 
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status quo should be readily deterred, even by an imperfectly credible deterrent threat.149  
However, if North Korea or Iran were operating in a losses frame, one of them might 
consider sponsoring nuclear terrorism, perhaps reasoning there was little to lose.150  This 
calculation, of course, depends upon the extent of despair.  Tools of coercive diplomacy 
such as international pressure and economic sanctions, for all of their potential benefits, 
more likely than not force these states further into a losses frame.151  Adversary 
perceptions of the status quo, therefore, are important.  The United States must be 
cognizant of the ways in which its foreign policy affects these perceptions. 
The United States’ use of the so-called “Bush Doctrine” of preemption in 
effecting regime change in Iraq, coupled with the labeling of both North Korea and Iran 
as part of the “axis of evil,” serves to implicitly threaten both of those states as well.152  
Both North Korea and Iran, then, may rightfully equate the status quo with the open-
ended threat of regime change.  If this threat exists regardless of their actions regarding 
sponsorship of nuclear terrorism, any related deterrence strategy based upon a threat of 
regime change—and thus by definition not increasing their cost over the status quo—
would be entirely ineffective.153  To be fair, this status-quo threat of regime change has 
been attenuated to a certain degree by the change of U.S. presidential administrations, the 
length and expense of the U.S. efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and President Obama’s 
“outstretched hand” engagement policy.  Nevertheless, more explicit assurances need to 
be given such that both states understand their security depends on their own actions and 
not on U.S. policy whims. 
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F. IMPLICATIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
I now point out several policy implications and make some recommendations on 
the basis of the above discussion.  These involve the focus of U.S. deterrence strategy, 
the nature of pre-attack deterrent threats as well as post-attack retaliatory actions, and 
status-quo actions and programs that must be changed, continued, or further developed. 
Since a deterrence-of-negligence policy would not result in the desired degree of 
international cooperation, the United States can significantly narrow the focus of its 
deterrent posture with regard to state sponsorship of nuclear terrorism.  Only antagonistic 
nuclear states should be targeted.  This narrow focus, then, utilizes a forensics-based 
attribution capability as a precise instrument for deterrence purposes, enabling the 
crafting of actor-specific deterrence policies for these few existing (and future) legitimate 
deterrence targets.  I reserve a more detailed discussion of legitimate deterrent targets and 
appropriate deterrent threats for Chapter V.  I now address strategic recommendations for 
response in the event of deterrence failure.   
If the unthinkable were to happen, how should the United States respond?  For the 
sake of argument, let us assume that after a terrorist nuclear attack the United States finds 
compelling—but not 100% conclusive—evidence that North Korea was the source of the 
fissile materials used to construct the bomb.  Given the current limitations of nuclear 
forensics-based attribution science, this is not an unlikely scenario.  The best way 
forward requires carefully balancing at least two important concerns. 
A first priority after a nuclear terrorist strike would be the prevention of another.  
Levi correctly asserts that a large degree of international cooperation, even with the 
offending state sponsor, would be required to gather and act upon all available and 
necessary information.154  He recommends a retaliatory policy that is “strong enough to 
maintain U.S. credibility but that is restrained enough to leave open the possibility of 
additional action if North Korean leaders do not cooperate in preventing further  
 
                                                 
154 Knopf, “Deterrence or Preemption,” 21–26. 
 44
attacks.”155  Such an approach would be difficult to find in practice—what, after all, 
would be strong enough to maintain U.S. credibility after absorbing a nuclear attack short 
of nuclear retaliation or regime change?   
This leads to the second major concern in responding to North Korea after a 
terrorist nuclear attack—any attack on a nuclear-armed state must obviously be 
approached very cautiously.  North Korea might attempt to deter a U.S. retaliatory attack 
by threatening a nuclear or conventional counter-retaliation on South Korea or Japan. 
I propose that both of these dilemmas could be mitigated by first issuing an 
ultimatum demanding North Korea’s submission to nuclear disarmament.156  As part of 
this ultimatum, an international regime would be established to verify and monitor 
disarmament.  North Korea would relinquish any right to the peaceful use of nuclear 
technology, and a continuous monitoring presence would be established to ensure 
compliance.  Assurances might have to be given such that compliance would avoid 
further violence.  This would, regrettably, keep the offending regime in power, yet would 
also offer a solution to the problem of needing the offender’s help in preventing follow-
on attacks.157  The United States might also demand that North Korea turn over for 
prosecution those individuals responsible for making and executing the decision to 
sponsor nuclear terrorism.  Rejection of these ultimatums would give the United States 
sufficient cause, as well as moral justification, to proceed with forcible disarmament and 
regime change, using “overwhelming force” if necessary.158 
I have just addressed what I see as the best option for post-attack response.  In a 
more perfect world, of course, deterrence would not fail.  Toward that end, I now 
recommend some actions the United States should take to improve the status quo in order 
to complement and bolster its deterrent efforts.  
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The United States must continue to develop its forensics-based attribution 
capability, both generally and specifically with regard to North Korea and Iran.  Although 
perfection is almost certainly unattainable, continuous improvement is necessary.  
Program successes should be widely advertised in order to give the U.S. deterrent threat 
more probabilistic credibility.159  Every degree of certainty with which a post-attack 
attribution claim can be made increases response options and lessens the inherent moral 
baggage involved.   
The United States must continue to emphasize cooperative programs to secure 
fissile materials around the world.  Since compellence strategies are less effective in this 
area, much more political emphasis must be placed on cooperation in its various forms.  
More political capital must be spent by the President and other top American diplomats. 
The United States must be aware, particularly with regard to North Korea and 
Iran, that its policies can work to increase or decrease those states’ satisfaction with the 
status quo.  This has important ramifications for deterrence success, as discussed above.  
This is not to say that the United States needs to actively work to make the world a better 
place for “rogue” regimes, only that there is a point at which certain coercive pressures 
can make risky status-quo altering options more appealing to adversaries. 
G. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The art and science of forensics-based attack attribution enables a deterrent 
posture that fills a critical strategy gap in the prevention of nuclear terrorism.  Deterrence 
theory supports the belief that attribution capability need not be infallible to offer a 
credible pre-attack deterrent posture, though the strength of any post-attack attribution 
claim will directly affect the range of possible responses.  With this in mind, the United 
States is best served by explicitly targeting the states and actions it wishes to deter while 
leaving the deterrent threats ambiguous.  This ambiguity leaves open the widest range of 
retaliatory options in the event of deterrence failure leading to attack, options that would 
have to be pursued cautiously in light of multiple post-attack variables in an extremely 
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challenging environment of intense domestic and international pressures.  This 
exploration of deterrence theory and U.S. strategic and policy goals has indicated the 
wisdom of limiting the application of attribution-enabled deterrence to adversarial states, 
while insisting on the furtherance of cooperative regimes with all other states.  The 
United States needs to make some adjustments to its stated deterrent posture with regard 
to state sponsorship of nuclear terrorism, while maximizing efforts to improve both its 
attribution capability, as well as international cooperative regimes. 
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IV. POST-DETONATION ATTRIBUTION CAPABILITY 
In this chapter, I examine the role of post-detonation nuclear forensics in the 
attribution of responsibility for the provision of nuclear materials used in a terrorist 
nuclear attack on the U.S. Homeland.  I will examine the levels of reliability and 
accuracy with regard to forensic technology and support required for a sufficient 
attribution capability, addressing current critical gaps.  If the United States does not 
currently possess these levels of reliability and accuracy, are they achievable in the near 
term and at a cost it can afford to pay?   
I begin the exploration with some necessary definitions along with an overview of 
the nuclear forensic process, to include a plausible timeline for expected results.  From a 
review of the literature and case studies involving pre-detonation nuclear forensics, I 
make a qualitative overall assessment of the nation’s current capabilities.  I then break the 
entire nuclear forensic and attribution process into its various components, extracting 
from the literature some widely agreed-upon requirements for a sufficient attribution 
capability.  Following the determination of requirements for each component, I analyze 
the current state of U.S. capability as well as identify critical gaps.  I then provide a 
general assessment of the likely costs—fiscal, opportunity, and political-capital—needed 
to improve and sustain a credible attribution capability. 
I find that although some aspects of the program are fairly well developed, in its 
current state the attribution program has not achieved the desired capacity.  I am not 
confident that, were a nuclear attack to take place today in an American city, the 
government would be able to authoritatively trace the attack back to its state sponsor.  
Although attribution-program perfection will never be achieved, existing capability gaps 
can be closed to a sufficient degree to enable credible deterrence.  The costs of closing 
these capability gaps, expensive primarily in terms of political capital, must be addressed 
with political focus over both the short and long term.      
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A. NUCLEAR FORENSICS—SOME DEFINITIONS 
In their leading textbook on nuclear forensic science, Kenton Moody et al. define 
forensic science, in general, as: “the application of any appropriate technical or sociologic 
discipline to narrow the limits of informed conjecture.”160  The limitations inherent in 
any type of forensic analysis should be evident from this definition—“the limits of … 
conjecture” are narrowed, not eliminated altogether, and “informed conjecture” is still, 
after all, conjecture.  Thus while nuclear forensic science provides a critical component 
of an overall attribution capability, it functions well only in concert with robust 
intelligence and law enforcement support, and does not offer in any case a guarantee of 
successful attribution.   
A report by the Nuclear Forensics Working Group of the American Physical 
Society and the American Association for the Advancement of Science provides a more 
specific definition for nuclear forensics: “Nuclear forensics is the technical means by 
which nuclear materials, whether intercepted intact or retrieved from post-explosion 
debris, are characterized (as to composition, physical condition, age, provenance, history) 
and interpreted (as to provenance, industrial history, and implications for nuclear device 
design).”161  Although pre- and post-detonation nuclear forensic processes rest on the 
same scientific principles, I largely limit the focus of this chapter to post-detonation 
attribution.  Post-detonation forensic analysis and attack attribution present more 
complex challenges for both investigators and policymakers.    
B. NUCLEAR FORENSICS IN THE CONTEXT OF ATTACK 
ATTRIBUTION—THE PROCESS 
Following a nuclear terrorist attack on a U.S. city, in addition to all considerations 
of initial response and recovery, authorities would be under enormous pressure to 
determine the source of the attack.  Terrorists may claim to have one or more additional 
nuclear weapons at their disposal, with goals from extortion to provoking widespread 
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panic and disruption on an enormous scale.162  Regardless, it would be prudent for 
decision makers to assume that the group did, in fact, have additional weapons.163  
Decision makers would need to know which state, wittingly or not, facilitated the 
terrorists in procuring the bomb or the nuclear material necessary to construct it.  This 
knowledge would focus intelligence-gathering and law-enforcement efforts, ultimately 
facilitating a realistic assessment of the likelihood of a follow-on attack, inhibiting further 
transfers, and informing retaliatory options.  How, then, would this determination unfold?  
What steps are involved in the process of attributing responsibility? 
The immediate and perhaps obvious task for investigators following any large 
detonation is to determine whether the blast was nuclear or not.  Supporting evidence 
comes in many forms: Air Force “Defense Support Program” satellites equipped with 
infrared sensors designed to detect nuclear detonations,164 seismic and noble gas sensors 
maintained by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization’s Global Monitoring 
System,165 radiation detection equipment maintained by various federal agencies, visual 
evidence as provided by a mushroom cloud, aerial or satellite photography conveying the 
magnitude of destruction, and a determination of the distance at which windows 
withstood the blast from the shock wave.166  This nuclear determination and yield 
measurement becomes more difficult and time-consuming when dealing with sub-kiloton 
nuclear blasts.167  Such preliminary indications of a nuclear detonation would set teams 
of experts and scientists across many departments and located around the nation in 
motion, some to gather evidence and some to prepare to receive, analyze, and begin to 
interpret the evidence.   
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Sufficient debris from a nuclear weapon can be collected even after a nuclear 
explosion.  Since only a small percentage of the fissile material in a weapon actually 
undergoes fission, much of the other nuclear material is left behind, albeit in the form of 
tiny fragments spread over a large area.168  Significant amounts of this material can be 
collected on the ground by robots or personnel with special equipment, and in the air by 
specially outfitted Air Force aircraft.169  This debris, after retrieval, would then be 
transported to one or more national laboratories for forensic analysis. 
Scientists have many analytical tools at their disposal in conducting nuclear 
forensic analysis of recovered materials.  Elemental and isotopic bulk analysis tools 
include chemical assay, radiochemistry, radioactive counting techniques, and several 
methods of mass spectrometry.170  Imaging tools, though less applicable for post- versus 
pre-detonation forensics, include visual inspection and photography as well as optical and 
electron microscopy.  Microanalysis tools include X-ray microanalysis and infrared 
spectroscopy.  The process of selecting appropriate methods is iterative, with the results 
of one test suggesting one or more specific follow-on tests.171  Additionally, certain tests 
are destructive in nature, making the “proper selection and sequencing of analyses … 
critical.”172 
These tests will be able to determine several facts with a fairly high degree of 
certainty: 1) Whether the weapon was built using HEU or plutonium; 2) If the weapon 
used HEU, the degree of enrichment with uranium-235; 3) If the weapon used plutonium, 
various isotopic signatures (time the fuel was in a nuclear reactor, time since separated 
from spent fuel) indicative of the production process.173  In turn, from such evidence the 
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sophistication of the weapon or even a certain bomb design might be inferred.174  An 
important distinction must here be emphasized:  a thorough nuclear forensic analysis 
should establish various signatures for the material in question,175 while such signatures 
may narrow the range of possible sources, a definite attribution cannot be made without 
matching the determined signatures to those associated with a known source. 
At this point in the attribution process, scientists would attempt to match the 
various signatures determined via nuclear forensics with existing signatures stored in 
databases worldwide.  Such source signatures can be either empirically derived from 
actual material samples or computer-generated, predictive signature models based upon 
the chemistry and physics behind nuclear processes.176  Although predictive signatures 
have some value in the absence of empirical signatures, empirical signatures lend much 
greater clarity and credence to the attribution process.177  As multiple signatures can be 
determined for any given sample, attribution is stronger when multiple signatures can be 
matched to known existing signatures.  As more signatures become available during the 
forensic process, intelligence-gathering and law-enforcement efforts can be more 
narrowly focused; the results of such efforts should be used to strengthen or confirm the 
ultimate forensic attribution determination.  How long is this entire process likely to take 
and what are the expected timelines for the various results?  
Although no guaranteed timeline for forensic analysis results exists, several 
authors provide approximate overviews of the procedural timeline.178  Many questions 
are asked throughout the attribution process, and the promptness of the answers often 
depends upon the physical limitations of nuclear science (e.g., determining a signature 
based on a decaying half-life takes a certain amount of time, by definition).  Additionally, 
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the complexity of nuclear forensic science cannot be overstated.  Its seminal textbook 
forthrightly states, “Radiochemical forensic analysis is a labor-intensive activity.”179  
Keeping these difficulties in mind, it is possible to frame windows of time during which 
specific questions could be answered and determinations made via nuclear forensics 
during the attribution process. 
Were a nuclear detonation to occur in an American city, nuclear forensic teams 
should be able to determine within hours if the blast was truly nuclear in nature as well as 
to approximate the explosive yield.180  Within a window of hours to days of the blast, 
experts would determine whether uranium or plutonium was used, as well as categorize 
the sophistication of the device itself.  Several days after laboratory analysis began, 
scientists would know the isotopic compositions of the nuclear materials, and with that 
information begin to make inferences regarding the material’s history.  Data from known 
nuclear weapons tests would be searched to look for possible similarities or matches.  
Several weeks after laboratory analysis began, scientists should be able to estimate the 
most probable weapon design, as well as search for similarities or matches with known 
existing designs.   
The strength of any forensics-based attribution claim would depend on the 
strength of signature matches; absent a match with either an actual sample or data derived 
from an actual sample, a credible forensics-based claim in any length of time is 
unlikely.181  Throughout the course of this process, intelligence and law enforcement 
information might be used to provide the political impetus necessary to gather signature 
data and actual samples from sources theretofore unavailable.  Likewise, information 
from the ongoing nuclear forensics analysis might serve to focus intelligence and law 
enforcement information-gathering efforts.  Coupled with authoritative intelligence, even 
a forensics-based hypothesis based upon predictive signatures can become a credible 
basis for an attributive claim.  In summary, then, scientists might have enough forensic 
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information after just a few weeks to narrow the field of possible sources, perhaps even 
hypothesizing that a particular source is the likely candidate.  However, absent a match 
with a known, existing signature from such a source, convincing attribution is not 
possible without additional and authoritative intelligence. 
This primer has provided a basic overview of the process, to include the steps that 
would be taken after an attack to gather and analyze evidence.  The capabilities and 
limitations of the scientific tests were emphasized, as was the importance of signature 
matching and the necessity of databases.  This section concluded with a brief exposition 
of a possible timeline for expected results following a detonation.  The question now 
becomes—how robust is the current U.S. attribution capability?   
In answering that question, I begin with a general assessment of current U.S. 
capability as gleaned through a literature review of open-source material.  I will then 
examine the following components of an attribution program in more detail:  scientific 
limitations and requirements, nuclear materials database, intelligence support, law 
enforcement support, and exercise requirements.  I have carefully selected these 
components for the major role each plays in an attribution capability.  In progressing 
through each, I will describe the requirements necessary for a fully functioning, credible 
attribution program.  From this examination, a picture of how far and in what ways the 
United States falls short should become clearer, as should the path toward achieving 
success.  I conclude by briefly addressing some potential costs involved. 
C. OVERALL CURRENT CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT   
To date, terrorist nuclear attacks have remained in the realm of imagination.  
Novelists and screenwriters have capitalized on the threat to sell books and movies, and 
policymakers have long imagined the worst and worked to prevent it.  The protagonist in 
Tom Clancy’s The Sum of All Fears receives a source determination from a nuclear 
forensics team within minutes of its arrival on scene, assimilates that information with 
specific intelligence on the supply chain, and quickly determines the terrorist perpetrators 
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and their state sponsor.182  Fiction writers often take such overly optimistic license with 
reality; policy- and decision makers cannot afford to.  What, then, should decision makers 
expect from the nation’s current attribution capability? 
Most scholars and other experts in the field make a less-than-optimistic 
characterization of the overall current capability to attribute a terrorist nuclear attack 
based upon nuclear forensics and support.  Charles Ferguson highlights physicists’ 
incomplete understanding of the fission process as it impacts forensic analysis, 
emphasizes the need for a significant expansion of sample databases, and points out the 
existence of methods for deceptively altering nuclear materials to conceal their source.183  
Caitlin Talmadge outlines technical, political, and diplomatic challenges to establishing 
credible deterrence through attribution before advocating an increased investment in 
forensic analysis technology.184  Michael Miller provides a thorough treatment of “well 
developed but not foolproof” forensic technology.185  Matthew Phillips focuses on the 
limits to forensic analysis as determined by the physical science itself, concluding 
pessimistically that even vast improvement in capabilities will not allow the guarantee of 
definitive attribution.186 
Since post-detonation nuclear forensics-based attribution will not truly be tested 
until the unthinkable happens, case studies are non-existent.  Exercise results are 
understandably classified; regardless, exercises cannot nearly approach realistic 
simulation of post-attack conditions.  However, case studies of pre-detonation forensics 
performed on surrendered or interdicted fissile materials provide implications that do, in 
fact, apply to both pre- and post-detonation attribution processes.  Such cases also 
provide a qualitative feel for the current capabilities of national and international nuclear 
forensics in a pre- or post-detonation attribution process. 
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Matthew Phillips analyzes a case of forensic analysis on uranium hexafluoride gas 
that Libya surrendered to the United States.187  U.S. scientists claimed to be 90 percent 
certain that the samples were of North Korean origin, which “sparked a scientific and 
political controversy” when IAEA forensic scientists came to a different conclusion.188  
The debate appears to have stalled over questions of political influence and implications, 
and open-sources do not indicate a resolution.  Kenton Moody provides a case study on 
an interdicted HEU sample in Bulgaria, which he claims as of 2001 was “the most 
thorough and far-reaching analysis of illicit nuclear material ever conducted.”189  A team 
of scientists from several U.S. national laboratories actively analyzed the samples for 
over nine months, deriving many important signatures and narrowing the possible sources 
to reprocessing facilities serving HEU-powered research reactors.  Although these 
scientists were almost certain that this HEU sample was produced somewhere in Europe, 
no definite attribution claim could be made as to the material’s source due to a lack of 
any database matches.190  These cases illustrate the difficulty and complexity of nuclear 
forensic analysis, both of which would only intensify under the enormous time pressure 
following an actual terrorist nuclear attack. 
A nuclear forensics capability does not guarantee successful attribution any more 
than having the ability to analyze fingerprints or DNA samples guarantees the 
identification of a criminal.  What is important, however, is that the capability to perform 
nuclear forensics exists and is being further developed, and that the existence of a 
forensics-based attribution capability is well publicized to provide additional deterrence 
against acts of nuclear terrorism.  I will now examine in greater detail the components 
that make up a forensics-based attribution capability, highlighting areas in which the 
United States needs to focus more effort. 
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D. PROGRAM COMPONENTS 
1. Scientific Limitations and Requirements 
Specialized equipment is necessary in order to gather and then analyze evidence 
after a nuclear detonation.  Personnel wearing protective gear will able to gather samples 
at a safe distance from the point of detonation; robots are needed within a certain range 
due to intense initial heat and radiation.  Aerial collection is possible using specially 
outfitted aircraft.191  The highly sophisticated equipment needed for analysis is located at 
several national laboratories, though some field instrumentation exists that could provide 
more expedient results.192  Equipment, of course, does not provide the answers on its 
own—the right personnel are required as operators. 
A sufficient number of able, qualified, and available scientists is a core 
requirement for a nuclear forensic capability.  The highly complex and labor-intensive 
nature of an iterative nuclear forensic investigation cannot be overstated.  The scientists 
qualified to conduct such investigations hold advanced postgraduate academic degrees in 
such disciplines as chemistry, geochemistry, radiochemistry, nuclear physics, radiation 
physics, and nuclear engineering.193  The current staffing requirement for these highly 
trained and experienced scientists at the national laboratories is estimated to be 75 
positions.194  Additionally, since the workforce market is not self-regulating at the 
present time, robust university and governmental programs are required that will ensure a 
continuing supply of the necessary brainpower. 
The current U.S. capacity in regard to scientific requirements is only barely 
adequate; additionally, serious warning signs, both in equipment and personnel aspects, 
cast doubt on the long-term future.  The Air Force currently maintains two WC-135 
“Constant Phoenix” airplanes capable of recovering radioactive particles in the 
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atmosphere following a nuclear detonation.195  These aircraft are approaching fifty years 
old.  Existing laboratory analysis equipment is sufficient, yet field analysis 
instrumentation is lacking.196  Kenton Moody highlights his negative experience with 
such field equipment, stressing the importance of faith in the right people over faith in 
semi-automated machine analysis.197  The national labs lack sufficient numbers of the 
right scientists, numbers that will continue to decline due to upcoming retirements and 
career-furthering transfers.198  Student enrollment in university graduate radiochemistry 
programs has dwindled; in fact, less than six doctoral degrees in radiochemistry are 
granted each year nationwide.199  Alarmingly, no comprehensive interagency plan exists 
to guide a national effort in addressing this personnel shortage.200  If the United States 
desires a lasting attribution capability, these present and future deficits in equipment and 
personnel must be urgently addressed. 
2. Nuclear Materials Database 
Because an attribution claim is strengthened when forensic data has been matched 
to an empirically derived signature, many analysts and leaders in the field call for the 
establishment of an international nuclear materials database.201  Michael Miller agrees 
that a global database would be an ideal solution, but suggests achieving a comprehensive 
database is unlikely due to the tremendous political and technical obstacles involved.202  I 
                                                 
195 U.S. Air Force, “Factsheets: WC-135 Constant Phoenix,” 
http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=192.  
196 Moody et al., Nuclear Forensic Analysis, 332. 
197 Ibid. 
198 Joint Working Group, Nuclear Forensics: Role, State of the Art, and Program Needs, 20. 
199 Ibid. 
200 Aloise, Gene, Nuclear Forensics: Comprehensive Interagency Plan Needed to Address Human 
Capital Issues, GAO-09-527R (Washington, DC: U.S. GAO, 2009), 3. 
201 Michael May (director emeritus of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory), Jay Davis 
(former director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency), and Raymond Jeanloz (chair of the National 
Academy of Sciences’ Committee on International Security and Arms Control) make their case in May et 
al., “Preparing for the Worst.”  Many additional scholars cite this article while echoing the argument; see 
for example Levi, Deterring State Sponsorship of Nuclear Terrorism, 26; Phillips, “Uncertain Justice,” 
432. 
202 Miller, “Nuclear Attribution as Deterrence,” 50–51. 
 58
will now describe what such an ideal database would entail before qualifying the current 
U.S. and worldwide capability and highlighting some of the more difficult obstacles to 
successful achievement of the ideal. 
The perfectly comprehensive database would include data on all known nuclear 
explosive materials as well as a library of physical samples of said materials.203  This 
data would include key elemental, isotopic, and physical properties of plutonium and 
HEU.204  Since each step of the nuclear fuel cycle changes signatures from previous 
steps, an exhaustive database would require validated signatures from the entire life cycle 
of plutonium and enriched uranium.205  The ideal data bank would include information 
and samples from nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states alike, from 
research, power, and weapons-fuel reactors, and from all phases of the uranium 
enrichment process.  Although the prospect of assembling and maintaining such a 
database is truly daunting, the payoff in attribution credibility would be immense.  Before 
estimating the feasibility of achieving such a database, it is necessary to describe the 
current situation and the obstacles to success. 
Although numerous nuclear materials databases exist in the United States and 
various other countries, none of these approaches the level of comprehensiveness 
necessary for credible attribution.206  The U.S. Department of Energy maintains a 
database with considerable information on uranium compounds.207  Some U.S. and 
foreign laboratories, certain private entities, and the IAEA have physical sample libraries, 
but these are limited in scope.208  Some unilateral efforts are underway; for example, a 
new position was created at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory for a nuclear 
engineer to manage an attribution database.209  Other efforts are multilateral in nature.  
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The Nuclear Smuggling International Technical Working Group, an independent 
association of nuclear forensics scientists, is working with Central Asian and other 
nations to assemble a database of both data and samples.210  How well would such non-
comprehensive databases function during an actual post-detonation forensic 
investigation?  
Most scholars believe that the chances of reaching a credible attribution 
conclusion using currently available databases during an actual post-detonation 
investigation are low.  Michael May et al. characterize the IAEA database as “incomplete 
and not designed for the event-driven rapid forensics … required in response to a terrorist 
detonation.”211  Matthew Phillips asserts that “existing libraries of data are more likely to 
help identify a stolen nuclear weapon than one improvised by terrorists using fissile 
material.”212  Michael Miller points out that, although certain sources may be excluded 
and the search narrowed, without a matching sample a single perpetrator could not be 
singled out.213  Given this pessimistic picture of attribution capability in light of the 
currently less-than-comprehensive nuclear materials databases, the desire for a 
comprehensive database should be evident.  However, the obstacles are formidable. 
Most of the obstacles to building a comprehensive international database of fissile 
materials information and samples are political in nature, though certain technical 
limitations are factors as well.  Many scholars agree that due to the heavy secrecy placed 
on state weapons programs as well as commercial-use fuel and reactors, comprehensive 
information-sharing with an international organization is not likely to be easily  
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achieved.214  Technical constraints include both the sheer volume of additional data to be 
obtained, as well as the inability to determine whether a given state has been forthcoming 
with all of its data and sample material.215 
Several proposals have been made to lessen some of these obstacles.  William 
Dunlop and Harold Smith call for the formation of a team of experts with a special 
mandate granting worldwide pre-attack access to data and samples and immediate post-
attack access to debris.216  Michael May et al. propose establishing a fairly complex 
database consisting of a public component, in which sufficient information is revealed so 
as to build confidence in the veracity of the source, and a classified component, which 
could be interrogated only at a time of need by vetted analysts.217  This database could be 
supplemented by challenge inspections similar to those incorporated in IAEA’s 
“Additional Protocol.”218  Michal Miller contends that a comprehensive database invites 
cheating by states, which might surreptitiously withhold or manipulate data and samples, 
and would thus create a false sense of security.219  He proposes, instead, a voluntary 
database, the goal being to establish a credible starting point while knowing there are 
knowledge gaps to fill.220  The more countries that participate in a voluntary database, 
the greater the pressure would be on any holdouts to join.221  An important consideration 
to bear in mind for all of these proposals is that they only provide partial solutions to  
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what amount to complex political problems, both domestically and internationally.  To 
implement any of them would require a considerable amount of political capital and 
international leadership.  
3. Intelligence Support 
The United States has been collecting intelligence information on other states’ 
nuclear weapons and energy programs since World War II with mixed success, and 
requirements driving the intelligence effort have only become broader in the post-Cold 
War world.  Although it is not possible to define precise intelligence requirements with 
regard to an attribution capability, I here attempt to paint a rough picture of current 
intelligence support based, in part, upon recent events, as well as to highlight some 
recommendations for the future.  The intelligence needed to support an attribution 
capability can be broken down, roughly, into two areas.  The first of these areas 
comprises efforts to bolster existing U.S. nuclear databases.  The second, much broader 
in scope, can be thought of as “classical” intelligence support, and includes the collection 
and analysis of any information regarding the nuclear capabilities and intentions of states 
and terrorist groups, as well as information regarding terrorist activities or plots.  
Intelligence from either of these two areas could be used to add significant credibility to 
any attribution claim.  
Intelligence efforts to bolster existing nuclear databases may be provided through 
various means, to include “human intelligence” (HUMINT), and “measurement and 
signature intelligence” (MASINT).  The CIA has responsibility for most foreign 
HUMINT efforts, though DoD and the FBI have increased their recent activity in this 
domain.222  Since 1973, the overall MASINT effort regarding foreign nuclear detonations 
has been the responsibility of the Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC).223  
AFTAC has developed and oversees multiple sensory arrays designed to detect nuclear 
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explosions as well as collect various signatures inherent in nuclear events.224  The extent 
to which these and other efforts contribute to the expansion of U.S. nuclear databases, if 
at all, as well as their degree of success in this regard is classified.  However, one report 
does suggest the insufficiency, underfunding, and underutilization of MASINT 
resources.225  Regardless, it is impossible to quantify either specific requirements or 
results.  Absent a comprehensive nuclear database, efforts should be made in this area to 
increase the extent of existing databases. 
The challenge facing the Intelligence Community (IC) in providing intelligence 
on the nuclear capabilities and intentions of states and terrorist groups is enormous.  
Various commissions and reports provide insight into recent IC failures and successes, as 
well as advocate many possible reforms and initiatives for bolstering future performance.   
In its Report to the President of the United States, the Commission on the 
Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction 
found that “the Intelligence Community knows disturbingly little about the nuclear 
programs of many of the world’s most dangerous actors.”226  These actors specifically 
include “Iran, North Korea, China, and Russia.”227  Regarding the erroneous pre-war 
assessment of Iraq’s WMD programs, what it called “one of the most … damaging 
intelligence failures in recent American history,” the Commission faulted both 
intelligence analysts and collectors from CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the 
National Security Agency, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.228  
Although it singled out IC successes in collection and analysis with regard to Libya’s 
WMD programs as well as the A.Q. Khan network, the Commission concluded that the 
IC’s collection strategies are insufficient both in scope and coordination to penetrate the 
myriad of potential targets today.229 
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A U.S. House committee report decries the gaps in the IC’s collection coverage 
regarding Iran’s WMD programs, both in terms of the Iranian program’s current status, 
and in providing actionable intelligence that would allow the denial of material support to 
the Iranian program.230  The report also emphasizes the need for greater insight into the 
inner-workings and intentions of the Iranian government, as well as the nature of its links 
to and support for terrorist groups.231  
These and other studies propose numerous suggestions for improvement.  The 
need to improve HUMINT capabilities almost always makes such lists, as does 
improving IC internal and external coordination.232  Other reports point out the paucity of 
language and technical skills amongst both collectors and analysts and emphasize the 
importance of correcting such deficits.233   
This brief overview of recent IC failures, successes, and recommendations for 
improvement indicates the daunting task before the IC, depicts the current shortfalls in 
capabilities, and provides a qualitative picture of general future requirements.  Nuclear 
forensics cannot function alone—without robust intelligence support, nuclear forensic 
analysis will not provide policymakers the credibility necessary for definitive action. 
4. Law Enforcement Support 
While support from the Intelligence Community is crucial to the success of an 
attribution program, law enforcement support actually provides the framework from 
which an attribution program may operate.  Such a framework should ideally be 
composed of vetted procedures for evidence gathering and transport, processing 
protocols, laboratory standard and best practices, evidence analysis techniques, and 
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ultimately, the determination of evidentiary standards for credible attribution.234  I now 
briefly highlight a few of the programs and initiatives underway, and emphasize future 
support requirements from the law enforcement community. 
The FBI, as the designated lead federal agency for investigating terrorist acts in 
the United States, manages and coordinates the preparation for and execution of all 
WMD investigations.235  The leader in the field of traditional forensics analysis, the FBI 
continues to utilize that core skill set while directing overall nuclear and radiological 
forensic investigations.236  The FBI has recognized its leadership and centrality in the 
attribution process by establishing several important interagency procedural and training 
initiatives. 
According to 2007 Congressional testimony by Dr. Vahid Majidi, then Assistant 
FBI Director for the Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate, the FBI Laboratory 
Division is “central” to interagency nuclear forensics efforts.237  The Laboratory boasts a 
Hazardous Materials Response Unit, composed of 27 teams of personnel and associated 
equipment located throughout the United States, that provides WMD “crime scene 
awareness” training to personnel across the interagency.  The Laboratory’s Chemical 
Biological Science Unit directs nuclear forensics investigations, working by formal 
agreement in conjunction with other U.S. government labs as well as AFTAC to analyze 
both pre- and post-detonation samples.  Additionally, the Laboratory has overcome the 
obstacles to performing traditional forensic analysis on contaminated particles by training 
its traditional analysts to operate in WMD laboratories.  Many of these innovative 
programs and procedures are precedent setting, both domestically and internationally. 
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More must be done, both unilaterally and otherwise.  Standards are still lacking in 
many areas of the attribution process.238  Significant gains have been made with regard to 
international cooperation, yet agreed-upon universal procedural standards do not exist.239  
Most significantly, the difficult problem of determining evidentiary standards has not 
been settled.240  While it can be argued that the degree of attribution “confidence” 
required for follow-on action is strictly a political determination, the law-enforcement, 
intelligence, and scientific communities must together determine “what amount of 
evidence, what degree of specificity, what scale of incriminating data, and what overall 
level of persuasive and circumstantial facts and theories enable a final [attribution] 
determination to be made.”241  Though related, the determination of evidentiary standards 
should inform the more complex political determination.   
The law-enforcement community understands the complex challenges it faces 
regarding nuclear forensics and appears to be making progress in achieving some degree 
of resolution on the easier issues.  However, much remains to be done regarding the 
formidable challenges of building domestic and international consensus on procedural 
and evidentiary standards.  Such consensus-building will continue to present challenges,  
for one, due to the sheer number of organizations and agencies involved in the attribution 
process.  The discussion now turns to the task of exercising the response of these 
numerous organizations. 
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5. Exercise Requirements 
Myriad governmental agencies at various levels play important roles in the 
attribution process, among them DoE, DHS, DoJ, DoD, DoS, and the IC.242  Given the 
potentially catastrophic consequences of a terrorist nuclear attack and the ensuing chaos, 
each of these agencies and their involved sub-organizations must have a thoroughly 
practiced understanding of their roles.    
The Tier 1 National Level Exercise series (formerly known as TOPOFF), 
mandated by Congress, has been valuable in exercising these multiple agency roles and 
serving to better prepare personnel ranging from senior government officials to mid-level 
bureaucrats to first-responders.243  The Department of Homeland Security sponsored 
TOPOFF-4, a two-year series of seminars, planning, and exercises called the “most 
comprehensive terrorism exercise ever conducted in the United States.”244  Various other 
exercises specific to the technical challenges of post-detonation attribution have been 
created by DoD, DoE, FBI, and the IC.245 
Although the frequency and extent of exercises to date has been sufficient overall, 
some scholars point out that the exercises specifically relating to the challenges of post-
detonation attribution have stressed the technical component over high-level decision-
making.246  Officials at the highest levels of government must be challenged to integrate 
all available information in the time frame that it would likely be provided them and 
make difficult attribution-based decisions all while managing public expectations for 
quick, forceful action.247  High-level comprehensive exercises should instill in policy- 
and decision makers a truer sense of what is currently possible in the field, as well as 
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provide impetus for increased investment, should that be deemed necessary.248  The 
pieces are in place, domestically, to establish such exercises today.  Since the credibility 
of any attribution claim would increase with international consensus, the number of 
exercise participants should be expanded as international partners join the post-detonation 
forensics-based attribution effort.    
E. COSTS TO IMPROVE AND SUSTAIN 
In light of this long, and yet not exhaustive, list of program needs, I now briefly 
characterize the likely costs necessary to achieve certain program improvements.  I assess 
financial and political costs qualitatively, ultimately posing the fundamental question:  
Should the United States be willing to pay these costs?  
Not all problems can be solved by simply “throwing” more money at them; 
however, money wisely invested can be a powerful tool on the road to success.  A bill 
being considered by the U.S. Senate as of October 2009, HR 730, would provide $30 
million per year over the next three fiscal years to create and fund programs within the 
DHS Domestic Nuclear Detection Office intended to improve pre- and post-detonation 
nuclear forensics capability, stimulate and bolster the nuclear forensic science academic 
pipeline, and create an office for centralized planning and coordination of all national 
nuclear forensics activities, to include exercises.249  Of course, in a national budget of 
nearly $4 trillion for 2009, $30 million is a relatively small number, and will not go far in 
a complex, technology-laden research and development effort.  Indeed, only 0.005 
percent of all nuclear weapons-related expenses are designated for nuclear forensics 
technology development.250  Graham Allison estimates that a “total war” on nuclear 
terrorism, “our highest [defense] priority,” would cost from $5 billion to $10 billion per  
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year, which he equates to “a penny of every dollar” of the current defense budget.251  
Clearly, though funds are not unlimited, the field of nuclear forensics and event 
attribution should be granted higher fiscal priority. 
Granting higher fiscal priority to nuclear forensics and event attribution is 
problematic, however, since “the nation’s nuclear forensics capabilities depend heavily 
on the continued funding of equipment, infrastructure, and personnel currently paid for 
by other programs.”252  Although the four agencies with primary responsibility for 
implementing the National Technical Nuclear Forensics program (DoD, DoE, DHS, FBI) 
spent or will spend approximately $60 million in 2008 and $59 million in 2009, the 
program’s true costs are higher due to its dependence on resources not reflected in these 
budgets.253  Thus, precise long-term fiscal needs are undetermined; effective resource 
allocation and program prioritization will be difficult until these true costs are fully 
ascertained.254 
A well-known principle of economics states that since resources are scarce, any 
expenditure incurs an opportunity cost.  In other words, financial and political capital 
dedicated to nuclear forensics and event-attribution program development will not be 
available for other programs.  For example, scientists researching and developing nuclear 
forensics technology are not available for the research and development of detection 
equipment and programs intended to prevent the incursion of nuclear materials or 
weapons into the United States; money spent upgrading forensics equipment is not  
available for improving detection technology.  These examples notwithstanding, most 
opportunity costs regarding nuclear forensics-based attribution development are likely 
political in nature. 
As referenced above, enormous political capital is required in order to overcome 
obstacles to information sharing and building an international database along with 
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forensics procedures.  This political capital would have to be spent by those that have it—
those at the highest levels of the U.S. government.  Whether or not these lofty goals can 
be achieved is debatable.  In the attempt to realize goals, furthering a national or 
international nuclear forensics-based attribution capability other “opportunities” might 
suffer.   
Many important nuclear-related programs require political attention:  The 
Proliferation Security Initiative should be expanded; the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
has never been ratified by the U.S. Senate and, as such, cannot enter into force; a Review 
Conference for the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty takes place in 2010 with important 
issues at stake; the IAEA’s “Additional Protocols” have not been adopted by all states; 
increased international support for the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test 
Reactors Program should be solicited; and programs such as the Cooperative Threat 
Reduction program and  the Global Threat Reduction Initiative would benefit from 
increased multilateral cooperation.  Each of these requires a large degree of political 
effort to maintain or improve.  President Obama’s ambitious goal of eliminating world 
nuclear weapon stockpiles may be considered in a more difficult political category 
altogether, as can counter-proliferation efforts regarding North Korea and Iran.  
Determinations of whether pursuing some of the aforementioned might mutually 
reinforce the goals of a nuclear forensics-based attribution program or prove detrimental 
is outside the scope of this thesis.  It is sufficient to say, generally, that time and energy 
spent on any given program is time and energy not available for another.  Political leaders 
must balance their available political capital with prospects for any given program’s 
advancement in determining international engagement priorities. 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The national capability to attribute a nuclear terrorist attack today is not assured; 
the program falls short of the ideal in several identifiable ways.  Although progress is 
being made in terms of improving scientific capacity, nuclear databases, intelligence 
support, law-enforcement support, and exercise programs, much more remains to be 
done.  As shown in Chapter III, a perfect attribution capability is not required for an 
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effective deterrent posture.  If a potential state sponsor believes that it would probably be 
positively identified, deterrence functions well.  Given the current state of the program, a 
potential state sponsor may not come to such a conclusion; thus, current U.S. attribution 
capability with regard to reliability and accuracy for deterrence purposes seems 
insufficient.  Although expensive, primarily politically and in terms of lost opportunities, 
this capability could be increased to a sufficient level in the long term.   
Should the U.S. government be willing to pay the significant costs required to 
increase its attribution capability?  In light of the risk of attack as assessed in Chapter II, 
as well as the benefit that the role of attribution-enabled deterrence provides as described 
in Chapter III, the answer is a qualified “yes.”  The risk assessment shows that the 
situation is neither dire, nor can the threat be ignored.  Attribution-enabled deterrence 
fills a critical strategy gap for preventing nuclear terrorism, but its relatively narrow 
application highlights the equal importance of complementary strategic programs.  As 
such, money and political capital must be expended across a spectrum of important 
programs.  Political focus is required to ensure the best investment of scarce fiscal and 
political resources both for the short and long term.  By ensuring that the government gets 
the most “bang for the buck,” national decision makers can build and sustain an 
attribution program sufficient to enable credible deterrence.  In the next chapter, I make 
additional specific policy recommendations with regard to program investment. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
In this thesis, I have explored several aspects of the Unites States’ nuclear 
forensics-based post-detonation attribution program and its role in deterring state 
sponsorship of nuclear terrorism, with the ultimate goal of determining whether the 
nation is “on target” in its efforts.  In particular, I have explored questions and made 
assessments regarding the following:  1) the importance of the program in preventing 
nuclear terrorism; 2) the levels of program reliability and accuracy necessary for effective 
deterrence; 3) the most appropriate attribution-enabled deterrence posture, as well as the 
credibility of this posture; 4) the specific role of nuclear forensics in the U.S. attribution 
program as well as the overall state of the program; and, 5) an approximation of the 
investment required to close the critical gap between current and desired attribution 
performance.  I now review key findings from earlier chapters relating to these points 
before making overall policy recommendations. 
A. REVIEW OF KEY FINDINGS 
1. Importance of an Attribution Program 
The risk assessment of Chapter II demonstrates that the threat component of 
nuclear terrorism is very low, primarily due to the exceedingly high barriers to terrorist 
acquisition of a nuclear capability.  The risk, however, remains significant due to the 
potentially enormous consequences of a nuclear attack, as well as the relatively high level 
of U.S. vulnerability to attack.  Furthermore, the risk assessment shows that one of the 
most effective current means for mitigating risk is by further reducing the probability that 
a terrorist group might achieve a nuclear capability.  Because it directly enables the 
deterrence of state sponsorship of nuclear terrorism, an attribution capability provides an 
essential means for reducing this probability.  In the absence of an attribution capability, 




sponsors might be encouraged by the likelihood of remaining anonymous.  Thus, 
forensics-based attribution plays a critical role in preventing nuclear terrorism.  The 
United States rightly desires a robust attribution capability. 
2. Reliability and Accuracy Necessary for Effective Deterrence 
As noted in Chapter I, the United States has seemingly acknowledged having only 
an emerging forensics-based attribution capability.  If deterrence depends on a perfect 
attribution capability, the United States has issued deterrent threats in vain.  This is not 
the case, however.  The analysis in Chapter III shows that although the capability to 
determine the source of an attack is the crux of the credibility problem, perfect 
attribution, while desirable, is not required.  A deterrent threat to retaliate explicitly based 
on strong, but not perfect, evidence would force an accused state to demonstrate that it 
was not involved; this effectively splits the burden of proof and compensates for an 
imperfect attribution capability. 
This uncertainty of attribution might have different effects on different states.  To 
the degree that states are satisfied with the status quo they will likely not be risk tolerant; 
hence, any chance of being found complicit in a nuclear attack should provide sufficient 
deterrence.  Conversely, deterring states dissatisfied with the status quo and therefore 
more risk tolerant might require a greater attribution capability. 
3. The Appropriate Deterrence Posture and Its Credibility 
The analysis of deterrence theory in Chapter III indicates that an inviolable 
redline should be broadly established to deter the purposeful transfer of nuclear materials 
or weapons to terrorists; this line should only be shifted to include unintentional transfer 
in certain situations and for specific actors.  The translation of this actor-specific concept 
into strategy reveals a somewhat narrow application for attribution-enabled deterrence.  
Only those few adversarial states that possess nuclear weapons or fissile materials that 
may potentially sponsor terrorist groups, and with whom the real potential for security 
cooperation is nonexistent should be specifically targeted with deterrence of both 
purposeful and unintentional transfer.   
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Deterrence can be strengthened in several ways.  The United States must be 
careful not to force its adversaries into a losses frame of reasoning by coercively 
maintaining an undesirable status quo.  Additionally, since a specific threat to retaliate 
with nuclear weapons might be perceived as unjustly punishing innocent civilians, 
credibility can be best maintained by ambiguously threatening a severe response.  This 
leaves all options available, yet pointedly reserves the right to respond severely and in 
kind.  Credibility also increases proportionately with the strength of the U.S. attribution 
program, since even reducing the degree of attribution confidence by splitting the burden 
of proof requires strong evidence against any given state. 
4. Role of Nuclear Forensics and Overall State of Attribution Program 
Chapter IV demonstrates that although nuclear forensics occupies the central role 
in a post-attack attribution program, it cannot bear the burden alone.  For an attribution 
program to function well and provide credible results, the intelligence and law 
enforcement communities must support nuclear forensic analysis.  Accurate forensic 
results depend upon highly specialized scientists operating state-of-the-art equipment and 
relying on the availability of informational and material databases.  Additionally, due to 
the technical and organizational complexity of the attribution process, a national 
attribution skill-set must be systematically exercised and evaluated in order to develop 
and maintain any given capability level. 
Much positive work has been accomplished toward developing the U.S. 
attribution program; however, shortfalls exist in key areas.  The understaffing of the 
scientific workforce at the heart of nuclear forensic analysis is projected to increase 
without focused governmental stimulus efforts.  Existing nuclear databases are 
insufficient.  Intelligence support should be strengthened, as should the framework 
provided by the law enforcement community.  Without sufficient government attention 
and resources devoted to these key areas, the nation’s attribution capability, already 




confident that its attribution program is currently sufficiently developed so as to credibly 
deter state sponsorship of nuclear terrorism, and should take steps to increase a potential 
state sponsor’s belief that it would be exposed. 
5. Costs to Close the Gap 
The investments required to improve the U.S. attribution program can be 
categorized as either financial or political, and encompass both direct and opportunity 
costs.  The need for increased direct funding is most easily addressed, but even this is 
complicated by the plethora of different executive agencies involved in the attribution 
effort.  Financial resources must be smartly managed with an emphasis on long-term 
program needs.  The most tangible financial opportunity costs in this area center around 
the employment of the nation’s nuclear scientists—those dedicated to nuclear forensics 
are not available to work on other nuclear national priorities. 
Political costs, both direct and in terms of opportunity, are difficult to qualify.  
Many different programs compete for priority and the necessary political attention, both 
domestically and in the international arena.  The political capital required in overcoming 
obstacles to creating an international database and establishing a multilateral nuclear 
forensics regime would likely be immense.  Since the political capital required to advance 
an international attribution regime might work to further other ambitious multilateral 
strategic goals, more research is needed to determine how to employ such political capital 
to best effect, as well as to qualify prospects for ultimate success. 
B. OVERALL POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
I have reserved this section of my thesis only for those policy recommendations 
that I feel are of the most pressing immediate priority.  Additional recommendations have 
been made throughout the thesis itself, and the fact they are not repeated here does not 
imply that they should be ignored in the long term.  In the most general sense, the United 
States should focus first on getting its own attribution “house” in order.  This is not to say 
that current international coordination efforts should cease—only that high-level political 
capital should be preserved and spent at such a time when the United States is confident 
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in all aspects of its own attribution program, knows the clear way forward, and can 
realistically achieve a high level of return for its investment.255  I now recommend 
several ways in which the United States can maximize its current attribution capability, 
invest for the future, and assume an appropriate deterrence posture. 
1. Current Capability Maximization 
The United States should maximize its existing attribution capability by 
instituting two relatively minor shifts in the execution of current policy.  First, the 
government must publicly assert the existence of a reliable attribution capability.256  This 
can be done, in part, by removing contradictory or misleading statements from its 
strategy documents.  For example, a sentence in the 2006 National Strategy for 
Combating Terrorism states,  “We will develop the capability to assign responsibility for 
the intended or actual use of WMD via accurate attribution,”257 this could be replaced 
with the following more convincing statement,  “We will continuously improve upon our 
existing capability to assign responsibility.”  The suggested wording is not untruthful—
the United States does possess an attribution capability, however imperfect.  In support of 
this public assertion of an attribution capability, attribution program successes, whether 
from forensics performed on interdicted fissile material or from exercises, should be 
publicized through scientific and other available channels.258  This is not to suggest that 
the United States should exaggerate its capabilities; embellishment might either seem 
incredible to adversaries or lead to unrealistic public expectations in the event of an 
attack.  As the United States projects confidence in its attribution program and supports 
this confidence with actual successes, the credibility of deterrent threats will be 
strengthened.   
Another way in which the government can maximize its current capability is by 
improving the design of current national-level exercises.  By putting greater emphasis on 
                                                 
255 Such an approach would suggest, for example, the continued pursuit of unilateral nuclear-materials 
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the high-level decision-making, interagency, and multinational aspects of periodic 
technical forensics-based attribution exercises, government leaders at the highest levels 
can be educated regarding current attribution capability and be forced to exercise 
decision-making authority in a simulated complex and time-sensitive environment.  
Moreover, results from these exercises can be used to shape the interagency—and, 
eventually, international—standard operating procedures necessary to ensure the most 
efficient practices should the capability ever be called upon.  By rehearsing various 
organizational and political challenges, the government would facilitate the development 
of valuable skill sets and interagency relationships at all levels, thus ensuring the best 
capitalization of its current attribution capability.    
2. Investment for the Future   
The United States must increase its investment in nuclear forensics-based 
attribution.  Since the risk of nuclear terrorism is real, an attribution capability occupies 
an essential position in the nation’s counterterrorism strategy both for enabling deterrence 
and for the prevention of follow-on attacks.  Without higher-priority funding and political 
attention, this necessarily complex program will fail to reach and maintain a sufficient 
capability level.  How can better funding and political emphasis be accomplished in a 
reality of scarce resources and competing priorities?   
The U.S. government must balance critical program needs with the fiscal and 
political investments that would yield the greatest long-term return for the least cost.  The 
findings of this thesis indicate that the scientific personnel aspect of the nation’s 
attribution program, more than any other, exhibits both short-term needs and the promise 
of long-term capability improvement.  Without the requisite highly skilled scientists, each 
requiring years of education and experience, no amount of future investment can sustain 
or improve a forensics-based attribution program.   
The United States must engage in a sustained, focused political effort in order to 
rectify the emerging crisis within the nuclear-forensics scientific community.  A U.S. 
Government Accountability Office report, published in April 2009, recommends the 
Secretary of Homeland Security “develop a comprehensive interagency plan to address 
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the human capital deficiencies affecting the NTNF [National Technical Nuclear 
Forensics] program.  This plan should include estimates of the long-term demand, from 
both the U.S. government and private industry, for trained personnel in key disciplines, 
such as radiochemistry, that support the NTNF program.”259  Additionally, a 2008 report 
by the Nuclear Forensics Working Group of the American Physical Society and the 
American Association for the Advancement of Science recommends government funding 
for university radiochemistry programs as well as specific programs designed to 
strengthen university-national laboratory interaction, to include fellowships, internships, 
and contract support.260  I fully endorse these recommendations, and add that such a 
government plan must include means for measuring the effectiveness of current and 
future efforts to bolster the national scientific pipeline.  The government should 
periodically revisit plan estimates of supply and demand and tailor specific programs 
commensurately with any new findings.  
3. Deterrence Posture   
The United States should not employ a deterrence-of-negligence strategy for any 
international relationships in which cooperation exists to any degree regarding the 
security of fissile materials, and in which the other state is not a plausible sponsor of 
nuclear terrorism.  Such a strategy would be counterproductive for two reasons:  1) this 
coercive threat would likely serve to hinder cooperation both before and after a terrorist 
nuclear attack; and 2) retaliatory threats based upon a negligence strategy stretch the 
limits of credibility when applied to cooperative, friendly states with nuclear weapons.  
This recommendation does not suggest discarding such a strategy for antagonistic states, 
or eliminating the possibility of post-detonation coercive pressure on an unintentionally 
offending state.   
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By dismissing attempts to coerce already cooperative states into greater 
cooperation through deterrence of negligence, the focus of deterrence can be narrowed 
considerably to antagonistic states possessing nuclear weapons or fissile materials that 
may consider sponsoring nuclear terrorism.  In today’s world, North Korea presently fits 
that description, and Iran may as well in the relatively near future. 
In dealing with North Korea, the United States should not be explicit regarding 
the nature of the promised consequences for sponsoring nuclear terrorism.261  This is 
consistent with existing policy documents and statements ambiguously promising 
“overwhelming consequences.”262  Although these threats hint at the perhaps incredible 
threat of nuclear retaliation, North Korea should not be given reason to doubt that the 
United States reserves the right to make any retaliation as painful as possible.  
Additionally, the United States should make explicitly clear to North Korea its intention 
to treat any transfer of North Korean fissile material or weapons as purposeful.  This will 
preclude any post-detonation “excuses” on the part of North Korea to make such transfers 
appear accidental (truthful or not) and thus avoid retribution.263  In short, the United 
States should specify the undesired actions precisely to North Korea, yet communicate 
the threatened consequences with ambiguity. 
4. For Further Research 
More research should be done regarding actor-specific deterrence strategies as 
enabled by an attribution capability.  Determining the impact of an imperfect attribution 
capability in deterring specific states and individuals within certain states would prove 
valuable.  Each of these targets’ risk tolerance and tendency to misperceive should be 
assessed; this, in turn, would facilitate more precise communication of both an attribution 
capability and the intent to respond.  Certain targets and/or states might become the focus 
of specific intelligence-gathering operations intended to tailor and improve the U.S. 
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attribution capability appropriately.  Additionally, the United States could shift more of 
the burden-of-proof to certain hard-to-deter targets; this shift would, of course, have to be 
effectively communicated.  
An accurate accounting of comprehensive attribution-program costs currently 
does not exist.  Congress should request such a report and use the results as a basis for 
future investment decisions as well as a gauge for measuring returns on investment.  
Direct and indirect costs across the federal government must be included, with a focus on 
capturing costs for the infrastructure and personnel that provide program support yet are 
funded by different programs.264  This will maximize current resource utilization, present 
a clearer picture of future program funding needs, and ensure the attribution effort is not 
unintentionally harmed by reducing funding for now-hidden support aspects. 
Further research is also needed to better evaluate both domestic and international 
political costs inherent to the nation’s attribution program.  Such research might take the 
form of a cost-benefit analysis, even attempting to assess the likelihood of achieving 
various politically challenging aspects of the program.  Comparisons should be made 
across the range of government programs related to nuclear weapons policy or the 
prevention of nuclear terrorism in order to determine which programs might provide a 
mutual benefit to the attribution program, which might prove contradictory in some form, 
and which have no impact whatsoever.  The results of such a study would prove 
invaluable to analysts and policymakers alike in determining which programs offer the 
best overall return on investment toward securing the nation from nuclear terrorism.  
An additional important area for further research, and one that may be related to 
the cost-benefit analyses described above, is the determination of measures of 
effectiveness for various nuclear counterterrorism programs.  For example, how effective 
is the GTRI in securing SNM stockpiles?  How much security is “good enough” when 
compared with program costs and in light of the risk?  Similarly, how can the 
effectiveness of the national forensics-enabled attribution program in providing a credible 
deterrence posture be measured?  Perhaps most importantly—at what point do 
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diminishing returns make the pursuit of further program development unfruitful?  In an 
age of ever-scarcer resources, policymakers and decision makers at the highest levels of 
government must make difficult judgments regarding which areas require more focused 
efforts in light of the nation’s risk tolerance.  In order to make such decisions, they must 
be given accurate information as to any tradeoffs involved, as well as which programs 
would provide—or are already providing—the most tangible benefits. 
Once the United States has maximized its own attribution capability, it should 
look for opportunities to strengthen the international attribution regime.  Further research 
should be done into how this could best be accomplished.  This research would have to 
address the political and technical difficulties presented by the biggest current obstacle to 
international cooperation—creating an effective international nuclear materials database.  
Case studies into past successes and failures regarding cooperative nuclear-policy 
regimes might be accomplished to determine how best to elicit international cooperation.  
A roadmap might emerge from such research, ultimately enabling policymakers to avoid 
common pitfalls as well as to best exploit opportunities for success. 
C. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
I agree neither with those authors who claim the risk of nuclear terrorism is 
extreme and that preventing it should be the highest national-security priority, nor with 
those who claim that the threat is overly exaggerated.265  To turn the cliché back around:  
it is a matter not of “when,” but “if.”  Nuclear terrorism is a risk of both low probability 
and high consequences; therefore, the United States must diligently pursue the most 
effective, yet practical, means for mitigating this risk.  Nuclear forensics-based attribution 
is one such means for risk mitigation, enabling both pre-attack deterrence of state 
sponsorship and post-attack response options.  I have demonstrated herein the fairly 
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narrow, albeit valuable, application of attribution-enabled deterrence.  I have also shown 
ways in which the U.S. attribution capability is lacking and have made suggestions for 
both current capability maximization and future improvements.  A strong and improving 
post-detonation attribution capability would increase the credibility of U.S. deterrence, 
ironically making the actual use of such a capability less likely to be needed.  Although 
the United States is currently investing both political and fiscal resources in its attribution 
capability, additional focus is needed to bring the effort more accurately “on target.”   
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